By Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola
At a Glance
- US Removes Syria from State Sponsors of Terrorism List — Washington ended Syria’s 47-year designation, lifting major restrictions on aid and contracting while opening the way for further export-control relief and financial reintegration.
- US Removes Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s SDGT Designation — Washington removed the Nusrah Front/HTS from its terrorism sanctions list, reducing compliance risks surrounding Syrian institutions and officials with historical ties to the group.
- Visa and Mastercard Complete First International Card Transactions in Syria — The payment networks processed landmark transactions, signaling Syria’s financial reintegration, although banking risk, limited coverage, and affordability concerns may constrain near-term adoption.
- Russia Resupplies Its Syrian Bases Through Sanctioned Shipping Networks — Russia used sanctioned vessels and logistics firms to deliver supplies to its military facilities in Syria.
Contents
US Removes Syria from State Sponsors of Terrorism List
The United States removed Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) on August 24, 2026. The US Treasury published notice of the removal after the conclusion of a 45-day congressional review period. President Donald Trump triggered the review on July 8, when Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Trump had “informed Congress of his administration’s intent to rescind Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, following a 45-day pre-notification period.”
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The US State Department published its first list of state sponsors of terrorism on December 29, 1979, under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. The original list included Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and Syria. The US removed South Yemen in 1990, Iraq in October 2004, and Libya in June 2006, leaving Syria as the only country from the inaugural list. The US had designated Syria because it alleged that the government of former President Hafez al-Assad supported militant organizations. The designation subjected Syria to stringent export controls, restricted US foreign assistance and federal contracting, impeded access to international financial services, and allowed victims of terrorism to pursue certain claims against Syria in US courts.
Removing Syria from the SST list has significant legal and economic consequences. In the financial sector, both the legal exposure associated with the designation and institutions’ broader risk perceptions have discouraged international banks and investors from facilitating transactions involving Syria. Delisting therefore eliminates one of the principal obstacles to the country’s reintegration into the global financial system.
SST designation also entails particularly restrictive export-control treatment. The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implements these restrictions in part through Syria’s placement in Country Group E. Following Syria’s removal from the SST list, BIS is in a position to remove it from that country group and increase the de minimis threshold for US export-control jurisdiction from 10% to 25%. As a result, fewer foreign-produced items destined for Syria would fall within US jurisdiction. Syria could also become eligible for additional license exceptions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), while exports to the country would cease to be governed by the strictest terrorism-related controls. None of these regulatory changes follow automatically from delisting, however. BIS would first have to issue a rule amending the EAR.
Restrictions on US foreign assistance have also been substantially affected. Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 generally bars nearly all such assistance to designated state sponsors of terrorism. Unlike the export-control measures, this prohibition lapsed automatically upon Syria’s delisting, thereby removing a major legal constraint on US assistance to the country. Restrictions preventing the US government from contracting or subcontracting with businesses owned or controlled by the government of an SST-designated country similarly ceased to apply.
The designation also had consequences under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Section 1605(a) creates an exception to sovereign immunity that permits victims of terrorism to seek damages from Syria in US courts for injury or death resulting from torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, or the provision of material support or resources for those acts. Delisting brought this exception to an end. US victims would nevertheless retain a six-month period following delisting in which to file claims arising from harm suffered while Syria remained designated.
In addition to these concrete legal effects, removal from the SST list relieves Syria of a substantial reputational liability. It also creates opportunities for international economic engagement that the designation had largely foreclosed.
US Removes Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s SDGT Designation
The United States removed the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designation of the Nusrah Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), on August 24, 2026.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The SDGT designation is one of two principal tools the US uses to designate terrorist entities; the other is the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation. The US issues SDGT designations under Executive Order 13224, which covers a broad range of actors, including financiers and front companies. The US had also designated the Nusrah Front as an FTO but revoked that designation on July 8, 2025. It likely retained the SDGT designation to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1267 sanctions targeting HTS leaders, preserve leverage over the group’s leadership, and provide political cover against potential congressional opposition to the FTO delisting. Retaining the designation also reflected the Trump administration’s incremental approach to easing restrictions on Syria.
However, the UN Security Council removed HTS from its “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List” on February 27, 2026, ending UN member states’ obligation to enforce those sanctions domestically and likely encouraging them to delist the group. The remaining US designation had implications beyond HTS because the group, despite formally dissolving, retained close links to Syria’s governing institutions. Approximately one-third of serving ministers have historical ties to HTS, while a larger group previously served in the HTS-aligned Syrian Salvation Government. These connections created compliance and risk-assessment challenges for banks, insurers, and contractors because of concerns that transactions involving Syrian institutions could make funds or economic resources available “directly or indirectly” to a designated entity.
Removing the designation improves the risk calculus and gives Western banks with global operations greater certainty that transactions involving the Syrian government will not breach US terrorism sanctions. Delisting may also reduce concerns about security-sector support, particularly the end-use risks associated with equipment, training, and dual-use assistance channeled through ministries previously viewed as close to HTS.
Visa and Mastercard Complete First International Card Transactions in Syria
Visa and Mastercard completed their first international card transactions in Syria on 26 August. Qatar’s QNB Group and Mastercard completed what QNB described as the world’s first end-to-end international card payment in the country, enabling eligible Syrian merchants—including hotels, restaurants and government entities—to accept international Mastercard credit cards through QNB point-of-sale terminals. QNB plans to expand the service gradually, subject to regulatory approval. Separately, Visa tested a live international transaction with Fransabank Lebanon and Paymera, a Syrian payment technology company owned by the country’s sovereign wealth fund. Visa said the transaction marked a step towards wider card acceptance and would eventually enable international visitors to use their cards in Syria.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The transactions took place just two days after the US formally removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The designation restricted financial transactions and created significant legal and compliance risks for banks considering business in the country. The near-simultaneous moves by two of the world’s largest payment networks provide one of the clearest signs yet that Syria is accelerating its reintegration into the global financial system after decades of sanctions and isolation. In the near term, it will likely have a greater impact on the domestic market than on tourists or expatriates expecting to use their Visa and Mastercard cards seamlessly across Syria. The introduction of these payment systems, however, does not mean that Syria’s banking sector has fully rejoined international banking networks. The country still faces a long path towards reintegration, particularly because financial institutions continue to regard it as high risk. Some banks may still block accounts simply because a transaction mentions Syria or originates from a location linked to the country. It remains unclear how quickly access to global payment networks will promote cross-border commerce, facilitate travel, support e-commerce and improve remittance services. Low public confidence in formal financial institutions also continues to constrain Syria’s payment sector. When global payment services were previously available in the country, additional fees made them unaffordable for many people. The challenge, therefore, lies not only in introducing these services but also in making them accessible enough to encourage widespread adoption.
Russian Convoy Resupplies Syrian Coastal Facilities for the First Time Since the August Deal
On August 9, Syria and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding governing the future of Russia’s bases at Tartous and Hmeimim after 18 months of negotiations. Under the agreement, Syria will assume control of civilian facilities, including Hmeimim airport and the commercial berth at Tartous port, while the two countries will convert military sites into joint training and qualification centers. Syria’s General Authority of Ports and Customs said it would take over the Russian-operated commercial sites at Tartous, including Pier No. 4 and its associated warehouses and facilities.
Despite this transfer, a convoy of four Russian naval and cargo vessels arrived at Tartous on September 7 to resupply coastal facilities used by Moscow’s military, according to vessel movements tracked by Reuters and maritime intelligence firm SynMax. One of the vessels is Sparta, which has long been used in Russian military logistics in Syria and is under US sanctions. Reports described the operation as Russia’s first such mission since the two governments reached the agreement.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The significance of the agreement lies less in Syria’s formal takeover of Pier No. 4 than in whether it creates a credible separation between civilian commerce and Russian military or sanctioned actors. The Syrian administration could improve transparency and reduce the berth’s direct association with Russia’s naval presence. However, foreign banks will look beyond formal ownership and scrutinize the operators, beneficial owners, vessels, insurers, payment channels, and cargo origins involved. Transactions linked to designated Russian entities or Russian-occupied Crimea would continue to carry substantial sanctions and reputational risks.
The agreement also reflects Damascus’s attempt to balance its dependence on Russian food and energy supplies against its need to attract Western and Gulf capital. Syria may have reclaimed formal control of strategic infrastructure, but it also assumes responsibility for ensuring that commercial operations do not allow sanctioned Russian networks to exploit its ports. The key test will therefore be the transparency of the contracts and payment arrangements governing Pier No. 4. Credible implementation could modestly reduce compliance concerns; opaque Russian-linked operations would reinforce de-risking and hinder Syria’s financial reintegration.