External Contribution: UK Sanctions in Syria: Optimising, not Opting Out

Ann Snow: UK's Special Representative for Syria

There is a fierce debate on sanctions in Syria, some of it based on fact, and some of it rooted in disinformation. Between Russia and the Syrian Regime, sanctions have been increasingly used as a scapegoat for Syria’s problems, from its collapsed economy to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, to the reason refugees are not returning to Syria.

This is at best a gross misunderstanding of the purpose and impact of sanctions. At worst, it is an attempt to shift the blame away from the Assad regime which, with Russian support, has consistently blocked aid access and besieged, bombed, and tortured Syrian people for over 13 years.

But there are also ordinary Syrians who ask whether, for the sake of those still in Syria, sanctions shouldn’t just be lifted to ease lives after so much suffering. And I also regularly hear questions and concerns about the indirect impact of sanctions due to overcompliance and derisking by banks. This is why I want to set out our approach as the UK.

It can be easy to forget why sanctions are in place, who they are (and importantly are not) targeting and what they are aiming to achieve in Syria. It can also be difficult to find space within this debate to have an honest conversation about this complex policy area and about what more we, alongside our international partners, can do to optimise our approach. To be very clear, this is not a change to our policy, but rather a reflection that 13 years into Syria’s conflict, work is required to ensure that sanctions remain fit for purpose.

So, to start with the ‘why.’ The UK imposed sanctions in 2011, along with our international partners, in response to Assad’s violent and barbaric oppression of the Syrian people. We have always been clear about the path to lifting sanctions: behaviour change and serious engagement with the political process in line with UNSCR 2254. There are many steps that would signal a change in behaviour, one example being to provide information about the missing and detained. Our sanctions target people responsible for the repression of the civilian population in Syria. This includes a Syrian intelligence officer who was filmed massacring civilians in Tadamon and who raped dozens of people. It means a Major General identified by the UN Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as directly responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria cannot hide assets in the UK.

UK sanctions in Syria mean that individuals who have committed heinous crimes cannot enter the UK, channel money through UK banks, or profit from our economy. Our sanctions do not – despite the narrative pedaled by the Regime – target humanitarian aid, food, or medical supplies. Of course, this is complex, and issues do arise. Collaboration with humanitarian organisations on the ground is essential.

To give an example, following the devastating earthquakes in Northwest Syria last year, we issued two General Licenses, which enabled certain humanitarian organisations to access financial and fuel services without the need to apply for individual licenses. This enabled them to focus on delivering vital aid in an acute crisis. In the last few months, we also amended the humanitarian exception to make it easier for organisations to acquire fuel and ease the process of delivering vital aid.

Some of this is urgent life-saving aid, but some is longer-term support to the Syrian people. In 2024, 40% of the UK’s aid budget for Syria was allocated to ‘early recovery’, which is an approach to humanitarian assistance that uses sustainable solutions to meet needs including to support local livelihoods. For example, rather than handing out food parcels, the UK is fixing irrigation and drainage systems so Syrian farmers can produce more food themselves. We are on track to exceed this percentage in 2025 and continue to look for future early recovery opportunities.

We are also engaging with financial institutions and international NGOs to try to address over-compliance and de-risking, including through the UK's Tri-sector Group (TSG). And we keep our sanctions under review, refining and adapting our Syria sanctions regulations to ensure they are targeted and effective. For example, in May 2024, we amended the humanitarian exception in our Syria sanctions to further facilitate the provision of fuel to humanitarian relief organisations, which was partly informed by feedback from the TSG. We also continue to target individuals linked to Assad’s illicit activities. In March 2023, we imposed sanctions on 11 individuals who facilitate the captagon industry in Syria. There is a way out of this conflict, a route set out in UNSCR 2254. This is also the route for a future lifting of sanctions and a better future for all Syrians.