More Syrians Seek Asylum in the EU Despite Rising Barriers: Balancing Values and Pragmatism

Since the onset of the uprising in 2011, the EU has been grappling with an influx of Syrian refugees. Although well below the 2014–2015 episode, the number of first-time Syrian asylum seekers in the EU tripled between 2020 and 2023, rising from 64 to 183 thousand. This slow but steady increase aligns with the number apprehended while attempting to enter the EU “illegally.” The continued arrival of Syrians, who constitute the largest share of asylum requests, and the absence of a solution to the conflict on the horizon have caused divisions within the EU as to the best policy response. 

The factors pushing Syrians into the EU have only strengthened over the past few years, with conditions in Syria itself continuing to be, according to the EU and the UN, unsafe for return. They face increasingly hostile rhetoric and regulations in neighboring host countries, particularly in Lebanon and Türkiye, the largest reservoirs of would-be asylum seekers. Yet as their humanitarian needs in neighboring countries rise, the EU—under the pressure of an economic slowdown at home among other factors—has consistently cut funding for the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the main UN-coordinated plan supporting refugees and host communities. These funding cuts are further aggravating the push factors for migration into the EU.

The decline in asylum requests to the EU after 2016 was primarily driven by the EU–Türkiye Agreement of March 2016, which significantly curtailed migration through the Western Balkans and East Mediterranean routes and instituted the return of intercepted migrants, entitled to asylum or otherwise, to Türkiye. The agreement was gradually reinforced by increased EU border controls and stricter asylum policies, commensurate with a decline in public interest toward hosting more refugees. The cumulative weight of these factors has pushed refugee smuggling costs beyond the reach of more Syrians and increased the risks of apprehension, return, and waiting periods for asylum decisions.

Some EU members, however, believe there is more to be done. Italy, Austria, Greece, and Cyprus, among others, argue that engaging with the Assad regime could facilitate cooperation on the issue. Despite the well-documented evidence of the regime’s systemic torture, gassing of civilians, and arbitrary arrests, these countries believe working with Assad is still worth it. They effectively argue that cooperation will enhance Syria’s security and economic conditions, potentially reducing the flow of future refugees or even facilitating their return.

Looking ahead, the latest Israeli escalation against Hezbollah in Lebanon risks pushing not only Syrian asylum seekers, but perhaps soon Lebanese nationals, into the EU. Since the latest attacks, more than 1.2 million Lebanese have been displaced. Yet this has not translated into departures, as the precarious security situation at Lebanon’s only international airport has reduced flight traffic sharply, leaving many trapped in the country. Among the nearly 200 thousand Lebanese leaving for neighboring Syria, at least a share of them might soon depart abroad from the country’s airports.

Despite the uncertainty, the same dynamic is likely to continue: burgeoning push factors faced with stricter migration policies. Syrians are increasingly on their own.