Obstacles and Opportunities for Syria’s Electricity Sector

Sector in disarray

During the conflict, widespread destruction of power plants, transmission lines, and distribution networks left the sector’s infrastructure in shambles. According to newly-appointed Caretaker Government (CG) Minister of Electricity Omar Shaqrouq, the cost of repairing the electricity sector is roughly $40 billion.

Former Minister of Electricity Ghassan al-Zamel had stated in March 2024 that the electricity sector had a current capacity of 2,200 megawatts (MW), about one-fifth of the 10,000 MW of installed capacity. It is unclear whether Mr. Zamel referred to 2,200 MW as the current capacity of all functioning power plants in Syria, or only those supplied with fuel. 

According to the latest available data from the Syrian Public Establishment of Electricity Generation (PEEG), the capacity across Syria’s power plants in 2020 stood at about 4,400 MW. More recently, on 31 December 2024, Turkish Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, after sending a delegation to Damascus to discuss ways to support the Syrian energy sector, stated that Syria’s power capacity stands at 3,500 MW.

But, the lack of oil and gas required to operate the country’s power plants means that, regardless of the actual capacity, power plants cannot run constantly. In July 2024, Mr. Zamel highlighted that Syria had managed to secure only 6.5 million of the 23 million cubic meters of gas needed daily, and only 4,500 of the 10,000 tonnes of fuel required.

As a result of both reduced capacity and lack of fuel, data from the Ministry of Electricity showed a 75% decrease in electricity output between 2011 and 2023, from 49,000 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2011 to 12,900 GWh in 2023.

Furthermore, of the electricity generated by the Ministry in 2023, a staggering 32% was lost in the network or self-consumed, per data from the Central Bureau of Statistics. This figure is nearly twice the 17% reported in 2010. It should be noted that these figures do not account for electricity theft, which was rampant during the conflict; we were unable to find exact figures for it. 

The remaining 68% was consumed by industry (31% of consumption; 21% of total production) and domestic use (69% of consumption; 47% of total production); these figures have similarly decreased by 75% from 2011. 

Though production in 2023 was only one-quarter of 2011 levels, and losses nearly doubled, it is pivotal to note that rationing is stringent, with a maximum of two hours of electricity per day, marking a 90% decrease from the average of 23 hours of electricity provision per day pre-conflict.

This can be explained by the fact that despite provision decreasing, consumption per capita has increased exponentially. In October 2023 Mr. Zamel explained that average household consumption exceeded 8 kilowatt-hours (KWh) per day, compared to 1 KWh before the conflict. This is likely because households increased their reliance on electricity during available hours to compensate for long outages, using high-energy appliances like heaters, washing machines, and electric cookers simultaneously. As a result, surges in demand overwhelm and degrade the grid, causing equipment failures, escalating repair costs, and worsening electricity supply reliability.

Regardless of the data used, the current capacity is well below the needs of both industrial and domestic use. Going back to the pre-conflict level of 49,000 GWh would require about 5,600 MW running non-stop; this coincides with a statement by Mr. Zamel in March 2024 that put Syria’s needs at “over 5,000 MW.” However, this figure does not account for seasonal variations, which result in fluctuations in demand depending on the time of year and time of day, indicating that actual capacity requirements could go significantly above 5,600 MW during peak demand periods.

Priority for CG authorities

Cognizant of the absolute priority electricity represents, since 8 December the CG Ministry of Electricity has intensified efforts to address Syria’s electricity challenges through inspections, strategic planning, and meeting with international stakeholders. 

On 9 December it was announced that a committee of engineers had been  formed to “manage [the Aleppo Thermal Plant] and work on returning it to full capacity in the coming days.” Since then, Mr. Shaqrouq has held meetings with the UNDP and the International Red Cross Committee, and undertaken various field visits to major power plants throughout the country to assess ongoing maintenance and operational improvements. At Al-Rasteen the focus has been on completing the new 524 MW power plant; Baniyas has prioritized repairs on their fourth steam turbine unit. At Tishreen, discussions have revolved  around boosting the plant’s 1,000 MW capacity.

In mid-2023, state officials, including Mr. Zamel, announced that Iran’s MAPNA- commissioned Al-Rasteen power plant would soon be operational. However, delays prevented its launch. By June 2024, Mr. Zamel expressed hope it would begin operations by year’s end.

The Tishreen plant—comprising three steam, gas, and combined-cycle gas turbines—seems mostly capable of operating at its installed capacity, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. However, actual output remains low due to the lack of fuel. 

The Baniyas Power Plant, out of service for more than a decade, restarted operations in December 2023, though only three of four turbines are currently operational. Repairing the fourth would add an additional 170 MW to the grid.

Assad’s government signed multiple contracts with Iran and Russia to repair power plants, but funding shortages and equipment challenges led to mixed results. Iranian firms, particularly MAPNA, completed some repairs at the Aleppo Thermal Plant and at Baniyas, while Russian contracts for power plant projects appear to have never materialized.

But reconstruction is only part of the problem; more urgently, fuel shortages risk collapsing the entire grid. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Syria lost its crude oil supply from Iran, leading the Banyias oil refinery—Syria’s largest—to cease operations on 19 December 2024.

Getting out of trouble

The recent US Treasury issuance of General License 24 (GL24)  is poised to provide some relief to the electricity sector. Most notably, GL24 allows for the supply and donation of energy products to Syria. Immediately as a response, Khaled Abu Dai, Director General of Syria’s General Establishment for Electricity Transmission and Distribution, announced that two electricity-generating ships from Turkey and Qatar are heading to Syria, bringing an additional 800 MW to the grid.

Despite this positive development, the timetable through which this increased capacity will enter Syria is unclear. Mr. Abu Dai mentioned that efforts were already underway to prepare transmission lines to receive power from the docking sites, though this might take some time.

Beyond this announcement, GL24 could also revive key international agreements involving  Egypt over the provision of electricity and gas to Syria and Lebanon that had stalled because of sanctions. Up to 800 MW could be added from Jordan via its interconnected grids with Syria, another significant improvement. In addition, Türkiye could also provide up to 600 MW to Syria’s electricity grid, based on pre-conflict interconnection capacity. 

In 2023, Syria received 636 GWh from Türkiye, equivalent to about 73 MW of continuous power exports, mostly to Idlib and Northern Aleppo. Throughout Idlib governorate, the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government successfully leveraged its ties with Türkiye to supply 24/7 electricity through its affiliated Green Energy company.

In total, the 800MW of additional capacity provided by the electricity-generating ships and the potential 1,400 MW of additional electricity from Türkiye and Jordan would represent as much as Syria’s current capacity of 2,200 MW based on Mr. Zamel’s figure. However, this would still leave a 1,200 MW shortfall to the 5,600 MW required to meet current needs in formerly regime-held areas.

Though the issuance of GL24 is a promising development, it remains insufficient. The license covers only the sale, supply, storage, and donations of energy products. This will not be enough to attract meaningful investments.