Q: Are you still based in Damascus, or have you relocated? What was the number of UN staff in Syria before the latest developments, and how many remain now?

A: We never left Damascus. From the start of this phase of the Syria crisis, we committed to staying and delivering, no matter what. We adjusted by relocating non-critical staff and positioning critical staff to work in this environment. Gradually, we're getting additional critical staff into Syria. We’re here, and where we still have access, we are scaling up our response.

Here in Damascus, we initially had about 250 personnel. Currently, we are down to around 80 critical staff. Additional staff are stuck in Beirut and Amman because the border has effectively been closed. Though the border is not technically closed, there are no longer officers on the Syrian side. Jordan informed us they would allow humanitarian staff and supplies to enter, and there are no issues on the Lebanese side, but we cannot proceed without Syrian border approval.

What started as my personal decision has now become a system-wide policy. Two days ago, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee—the highest body overseeing global humanitarian affairs—made a decision to scale up the response in Syria to the highest level, requiring all actors to release the resources needed for this operation. It’s akin to declaring a state of emergency.

Q: How are you coordinating with authorities in Damascus? Who are you speaking with, and how is that working?

A: It’s still challenging because the government has just been formed, and we are dealing with different individuals claiming authority. We don’t yet know who truly holds that authority. However, we’ve continued messaging to all of them that we are here and committed to delivering humanitarian assistance throughout this crisis. We emphasize the need for an interlocutor because there are things we need to plan together. Yesterday, I met with someone claiming to represent the political side. We expect the Emergency Relief Coordinator to visit next week, and need someone to help plan that trip.

Outside Damascus, coordination is easier. I sent a delegation of agency heads to Homs, Aleppo, and Hama. They met with representatives from the Humanitarian Action Committee (HAC), which was previously operational in Idlib and now oversees the humanitarian file countrywide. However, here in Damascus, it’s too early, and they are preoccupied with other priorities at the moment.

Q: What is the current status of aid delivery in Syria, and what impact has the lack of an interlocutor had on the UN's programming over the past four days?

A: In areas outside Damascus, like in Aleppo and Homs, life is slowly returning to normal. However, in Damascus, it remains challenging. Up until yesterday (December 11), there was very little movement in the city. Initially, there was a lot of gunfire—mostly celebratory—but it scared the population, so people stayed home.

Unfortunately, during the chaos that followed the regime's fall, several of our warehouses were looted, including those belonging to the WHO, WFP, and UNFPA. We attribute this mostly to criminal elements taking advantage of the situation.

My immediate concern was the abrupt halt in the healthcare system. I’ve been pushing for airlifting medical supplies as quickly as possible. We have a shipment scheduled to arrive in Syria on the 19th, assuming the airports are operational by then. Even if the new government convinces civil aviation employees to return to work, the destruction of radar systems by the IDF presents a significant challenge for aircraft landings and departures. We are exploring alternatives with the WHO, including using the UN Humanitarian Air Service to maintain a steady supply of medicines.

We’ve also secured permission from the Jordanian government to allow humanitarian supplies to enter Syria despite their sealed border. Healthcare remains my priority, and I’ve communicated this to all available interlocutors in the new government.

While the situation outside Damascus is stabilizing, one major challenge is in the northeast, where fighting continues between the SNA and the SDF, and in some areas between HTS and the SDF around Aleppo. The limited activity for civilians is mostly concentrated in Hasakah, Qamishli, and nearby areas. The fighting in these regions has caused significant displacement. Since the current conflict cycle began with the capture of Aleppo, 370,000 people have been displaced, and this number grows daily.

Q: Are the 370,000 displaced persons spread across the country or concentrated in specific regions?

A: Primarily in the northeast and northwest; the populations of places like Nubul and Zahra have largely been displaced. Much is occurring along ethnic lines, with Kurds in the northwest being pushed toward the northeast. This is deeply concerning—not just from a humanitarian perspective, but also from a human rights standpoint.

Q You mentioned the HAC, which operates under the Salvation Government dominated by HTS, an organization designated “terrorist” by the UN. Previously, HAC coordinated cross-border humanitarian funds. Now, they seem to be running everything nationwide. Has HTS explicitly indicated that HAC will be your primary counterpart? And what does this mean for the Cross-Border Humanitarian Fund (CBHF)? Will it continue to operate, or is its mandate now unnecessary?

A: From a humanitarian perspective, HTS’s designation is not significant. We must work with any group controlling territories with populations in need of assistance. This is a global standard for humanitarian operations. While this designation may matter for the political file, it does not impact our humanitarian efforts.

Second, the new Prime Minister has stated that the Salvation Government will be the nucleus of his administration. For now, the individuals running its departments appear to be tasked with national-level functions. Whether this will last through the three-month transition remains unclear. As long as they serve as interlocutors, we will work with them.

Regarding cross-border operations, the UN system is reviewing these modalities. Some voices within the organization and NGOs are advocating for abolishing the "Whole of Syria" architecture. I caution against this, as it’s premature and could lead to unnecessary infighting. Ultimately, this decision lies with the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

Understandably, colleagues in Gaziantep feel nervous. Their interlocutors in Idlib have moved to Damascus. Similarly, my team here feels that the entire country can now be covered without external offices. It’s a transitional period with many uncertainties, but everything should eventually fall into place.

Q: What is the mechanism for delisting HTS, which is a UN-designated “terrorist” entity? Is it procedural, or does it require a Security Council vote?

A: We discussed this recently  with the UN legal department. HTS’s designation doesn’t directly affect our operations. The UN engages with actors designated as terrorists worldwide to deliver humanitarian aid, as we are not a member state and don’t confer legitimacy on interlocutors.

The designation was made by the Security Council, and only the Council can change it. Some member states, such as the US and UK, also label HTS as a terrorist organization. Some are reportedly considering revising this designation as leverage to push HTS towards inclusivity and reforms.

Q: Have you personally met Mr. Al-Bashir or Ahmed Al-Sharaa?

A: Not yet. Last night I met someone who claimed to be a member of the political committee. I informed him that the Emergency Relief Coordinator is coming here—next Wednesday (December 18) and would like to meet with those two gentlemen. We need to sit down and plan, but I haven’t heard back yet.

Q: Do we have any updated numbers on the Syrian returnees from Turkey, Lebanon, or even Jordan?

A: Returns from Turkey are increasing steadily, and I’m very concerned. Syria is not ready to accommodate a massive return of refugees. Basic services are stretched to their limits, if they exist at all, and now we’re heading into winter. Infrastructure has been decimated, and we don’t have the resources to support large numbers of returnees.

We’re already struggling with about 500,000 returnees from Lebanon since September 27, most of whom are hosted by their own communities which are under immense strain. Additionally, estimates suggest that around 60,000 Syrians have returned from Lebanon since the fall of the Assad regime, likely men who stayed behind in September due to fears of conscription or other risks.

Returning to one’s country is a fundamental right. However, orderly and managed returns require a comprehensive plan, which can only be achieved in partnership with the government. I’ve been raising this issue with interlocutors from the new administration.

Massive resources will also be required to provide adequate support. Lastly, I am deeply disheartened by the actions of 17 countries, mostly European, [who] suspended Syrian asylum applications immediately following the fall of Assad's government. This is unacceptable, and I’ve urged the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to address this with one unified voice.

A: You’ve been advocating for a Risk Management Unit to counter aid diversion and coercion under the former Syrian government. Given that the UN has worked with HAC before, are you concerned about similar risks under HAC?

A: I didn’t directly deal with HTS or HAC in the past. Our Gaziantep colleagues managed operations in Idlib; we didn’t have a physical presence in those areas. It was primarily a cross-border operation.

That said, it would be prudent to establish a robust risk management unit in Damascus, adequately resourced to handle this transition. The international community is likely to invest heavily in Syria’s stabilization during this period. Careful oversight is critical to prevent misuse of resources.

You raised an important point—our focus is no longer solely humanitarian. Many impediments that prevented broader development work are now gone. Priorities include legal and judicial reform, lifting sanctions, re-establishing relationships with international financial institutions, and shifting from early recovery to reconstruction. We also need to address demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.

I’ve flagged these priorities to the Secretary-General and the Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, urging clear guidance on how to proceed. This transition presents enormous opportunities, but also challenges. The humanitarian effort, despite its scale, will now be just one piece of the puzzle.

Q: Are you expecting additional funding from states?

A: Yes. Traditional donors have shown strong interest in stabilizing Syria post-Assad. Some aim to support Syria’s path to democracy, while others seek stability to facilitate the return of refugees from their countries. Whatever the motivation, I anticipate significant resources will flow into Syria for stabilization efforts.