Analytical Brief: US Legislative Developments on Syria

By Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola and Natasha Hall

Prepared with the advisory input and expert contributions of Ivonne Duarte-Peña, sanctions expert, UN Office of the Special Envoy for Syria (in a personal capacity) and Sameer Saboungi (US–Syria Business Council).

Contents

Key Takeaways

Reported bipartisan deal on Caesar Act repeal

On 21 September 2025, lawmakers from both parties reportedly agreed to repeal the Caesar Act through an amendment to the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The deal remains unconfirmed. If real, and if Congress follows through, any further legislation currently in the pipeline concerning the Caesar Act would become irrelevant.

Eight Syria-related bills in the pipeline

Congress is currently considering eight Syria-related bills, each reflecting a different vision for US policy toward Damascus in the post-Assad era.
These fall into three categories: repeal-focused bills that aim to end the Caesar Act; amend-and-condition bills that revise rather than repeal the Act, and security-focused bills that emphasize counter-narcotics and counterterrorism.

Repeal momentum but stalled progress

Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers have introduced repeal bills, arguing that the Caesar Act has outlived its purpose and now blocks recovery, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. These proposals continue to gain bipartisan sponsors but they remain stalled at a committee level.
In June, Rep. Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina) tried to attach repeal language to the FY 2026 NDAA, but the House of Representatives (House; HR) rejected the amendment on technical grounds. The Senate’s similar attempt also failed. The reported 21 September bipartisan deal to include repeal language in the NDAA appears to have reopened that path, and the repeal bill is gaining more supporters.

Amend-and-condition category and other bills

Rep. Michael Lawler (R-New York) introduced a bill that preserves the Caesar Act, but allows for indefinite suspension and creates an automatic termination mechanism if Syria meets eight conditions for two consecutive years. The bill cleared the House Financial Services Committee in July but has yet to advance to a full House vote.
Other bills pursue narrower goals: blocking sales from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to adversarial states, creating a “state sponsor of unlawful detention” designation, or requiring terrorist threat assessments on Syria.

Administration and business stance

The Trump Administration has not formally endorsed any bill, but the US Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Tom Barrack, has voiced support for bills calling for a full repeal. Many companies cite the Caesar Act as a key barrier to investing in Syria as it continues to hinder formal financial transfers to and between Syria and the establishment of correspondent banking relationships. This may explain why repealing the Caesar Act was a central demand of the Syrian government in its recent visit to Washington, DC, and New York City.
However, with repeal efforts not formally endorsed and counter-legislation seeking to prolong or impose additional conditions, the US risks entrenching a framework whose original rationale—the continued presence of the Assad regime—no longer matches today’s realities.

Looking ahead

The months ahead will be pivotal as the bipartisan political agreement offers new prospects for ending statutory US secondary sanctions targeting Syria. Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Washington in September for talks with Senators and Representatives on permanently lifting the remaining sanctions.
This push coincides with several parallel developments: the rollout of Executive Order 14312, the removal of HTS’s FTO designation, the reassessment of Syria’s status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and Ahmad al-Sharaa’s address at the United Nations.
At the same time, the US government shutdown, in effect since 1 October 2025, is likely to delay consideration of unrelated priority legislation such as the FY2026 NDAA. Together, these developments will shape congressional deliberations and signal the direction of future US engagement with Damascus.

Syria Sanctions Bills Tracker

Alongside the first issue of the analytical brief format, we are also launching the Syria Sanctions Bills Tracker. This dashboard accompanies our analytical brief on US legislative developments related to Syria, providing an interactive tool to track, compare, and analyze congressional bills shaping US sanctions policy.

Users can search by bill number, title, sponsor, or committee, and filter results by chamber, status, bipartisan support, or committee referral. Each entry links directly to official Congress.gov sources for verification and further detail.

Updated weekly, the tracker consolidates all publicly available information on Syria-related bills, allowing policymakers, analysts, and researchers to:

Monitor the evolution of sanctions reform and repeal efforts
Follow emerging bipartisan dynamics in Congress
Identify legislative priorities influencing US policy toward Syria.

Which Bills Are Currently in Congress?

Repeal Bills

HR 3941 (119th Congress) — Repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019
Policy Rationale
Representative Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina)¹ introduced HR 3941 in the House on 12 June 2025.² The bill seeks to fully repeal the Caesar Act of 2019, aligning with President Trump’s Syria policy. Wilson and Representative Maxine Waters (D-California) argue that the Caesar Act has achieved its purpose and should be lifted to support Syria’s economic recovery and prevent an extremist resurgence. StatusThe bill was referred to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Financial Services. Representative Abraham Hamadeh (R-Arizona) initially cosponsored but withdrew his support on 22 July following the violent clashes in Sweida between Bedouins, Druze, and Syria’s General Security forces.³ Currently, the bill has 18 bipartisan cosponsors: 11 Democrats, and 7 Republicans, including Representative Wilson.Wilson also introduced the same repeal language in the House Rules Committee as an amendment to HR 3838 (119th)—2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the annual must-pass defense policy bill due for a vote by December 2025. This approach would have allowed repeal language to advance even if this standalone bill remains stalled in committee. The House Rules Committee rejected the amendment. There is still a chance that a provision repealing or amending the Caesar Act could be introduced into the FY2026 NDAA when Senate and House lawmakers reconcile their versions of the bill in committee. However, the reported bipartisan deal of 21 September to include repeal language in the NDAA appears to have reopened that path. The Senate version of the NDAA also contains repeal language and still awaits a vote.

The US Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Tom Barrack, together with US-based Syrian associations such as the Syrian Emergency Task Force and the Syrian American Council,⁴has publicly endorsed Wilson’s bill to repeal the Caesar Act.

S 2133 (119th Congress) – Senate Companion to HR 3941
Policy Rationale
Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-New Hampshire) introduced S 2133 in the Senate on 18 June 2025, with Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) as a cosponsor.⁵The bill mirrors HR 3941 (Representative Wilson’s bill) and calls for repealing the Caesar Act. In a joint statement, Shaheen and Paul said: “The legislation reflects a growing recognition that while the Caesar Act achieved its goal of isolating the Assad regime, it now risks obstructing Syria’s path toward stability, democracy and reconstruction. Repealing the Caesar Act would end broad-based economic sanctions while preserving US tools to hold Syrian officials accountable.” Status The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, despite bipartisan sponsors, faces an uphill path with no hearings or markups scheduled. HR 3941 has 16 cosponsors in the 435-member House, while S 2133 has drawn only 2 cosponsors—one from each party—in the 100-member Senate. On 25 August, Senator Shaheen and Representative Wilson led the first official US delegation to Syria in years, pressing for a permanent repeal of sanctions, which they said were holding back the country’s recovery from a brutal civil war.Wilson also submitted repeal language as an amendment to the House NDAA (HR 3838), but the Rules Committee rejected it. The separate Senate version of the NDAA, S 2296 (119th), includes similar repeal language, though its fate remains uncertain. Still, these efforts remain politically precarious for some lawmakers, given the profound political change in Syria and the reputational risks of repealing sanctions at this stage. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once an al-Qaeda offshoot, only had its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation lifted in July 2025. Any legislative action that lifts sanctions without replacing them with a tailored framework risks being interpreted as acquiescence to an entity that remains designated as a terrorist (SDGT and UN) now in power. For these lawmakers, concerns about minority rights in Syria are top of mind, and an unconditional repeal of the Caesar Act is viewed as potentially enabling or blessing violations against religious and ethnic minorities by the interim Syrian government. Thus, a blanket repeal may appear problematic for certain lawmakers unless paired with new legislation targeting post-Assad threats—particularly HTS’s treatment of minorities, political dissidents, and its overall human rights record.

Other lawmakers believe that Caesar Act sanctions hurt all Syrians, including minorities, and obstruct the interim Syrian government’s capacity to protect and govern all Syrian citizens equally. Expectations for governance in a post-conflict Syria—such as full protection of minorities or robust security guarantees—require an effective, rights-sensitive security sector. Rebuilding national security institutions will demand major outside investment and technical assistance; without it, even well-intentioned local leaders will struggle to prevent abuses or protect vulnerable communities. These lawmakers point that the existence of the Caesar Act hinders necessary foreign investments and bank transfers, which in turn also obstructs efforts by other governments to provide technical and financial assistance to the interim Syrian government.

US domestic political dynamics will also shape the debate. Israeli officials, long active in Washington on Syria policy, have repeatedly secured support for measures aligned with their security priorities, including conditions for sanctions relief. That momentum slowed after President Trump announced the “cessation of sanctions” on Syria in May 2025. The Israeli government continues to advocate for conditional sanctions relief, hindering efforts for a blanket repeal of the Caesar Act. These efforts could diminish if the Trump Administration confirms its support for a blanket repeal and Israel and Syria sign a new security agreement, or could escalate if they do not, or if violence erupts again with Druze factions in Sweida province.

HR 4241 (119th Congress) – Repealing Syria Sanctions
Representative Ilhan Omar (D-Minnesota) introduced HR 4241 on 27 June 2025, with Representative Anna Paulina Luna (R-Florida) as a cosponsor. Like HR 3941, it was referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Financial Services, where it currently remains.
Policy Rationale
The bill proposes to repeal two major sanctions laws:
- The Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2021, otherwise known as Title 7 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, which formed the basis for earlier sanctions tied to human rights abuses.
- The Caesar Act, in Title 74 of the FY 2020 NDAA.
Therefore, Rep. Omar and Rep. Luna’s bill resembles Rep. Wilson’s bill with the blanket repeal of the Caesar Act, with the addition of a blanket repeal of the Syria Human Rights Accountability Act (SHRA). The SHRA requires the Administration to report on Syrian government officials responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses against Syrian citizens or their family members every 180 days or as new information becomes available. The SHRA then mandates sanctions against each person identified by the Administration in its reports.

Among Syria sanctions authorities that have been terminated, the SHRA remains in force as a human-rights–focused tool. It can reinforce accountability and help deter serious human-rights violations.

Status

The bill’s prospects remain uncertain but it will likely not gain momentum. The SHRA has received little attention and few lawmakers have expressed interest in repealing it. Representative Wilson’s bill, HR 3941, has received greater support and will likely be backed by Rep. Omar and Rep. Luna eventually, reflecting growing bipartisan recognition of the humanitarian costs of broad sanctions. Still, some members of Congress remain wary of easing pressure on Damascus, even under new leadership. At the same time, movement on HR 4427 (119th)—which signals a hawkish stance toward Syria’s new administration—suggests Congress may lean toward maintaining pressure.

Bills to Delay Repeal with Conditions

HR 4427 (119th Congress) – Syria Sanctions Accountability Act of 2025
Policy Rationale
Representative Michael Lawler (R-New York) introduced HR 4427 on 16 July 2025. The bill keeps the Caesar Act in place without changing its original expiry date (sunset clause). However, its key provisions amend the Caesar Act in significant ways, by offering a narrow path to termination by the President if Syria meets a list of conditions for two consecutive years, and giving the president authority to suspend or waive the Act indefinitely, removing the current 180-day renewable limit.Currently, the Caesar Act allows the President to waive enforcement of the Act on national interests grounds, and suspend the Act if the President certifies that the seven conditions in the Act are being met by the Syrian government. The existing conditions relate to the serious human rights abuses committed by the Assad regime, including the siege and bombardment of residential areas and the detention of political prisoners. Suspension and waiver can only last for 180-day periods, subject to renewal. HR 4427 adds two further conditions for the suspension of the Caesar Act. Therefore, the bill maintains the original requirements for sanctions relief that Syria must meet,⁶and adds the following new provisions requiring Syria to:

Combat illicit captagon production and proliferation
End targeting or extrajudicial detention of religious minorities.

Lawler’s bill leaves the Caesar Act’s expiration date at December 2029. During this period, the president retains the authority to waive or suspend the Act’s application. Unlike the current version, HR 4427 would allow the president to indefinitely waive or suspend the Act. The bill also allows the Act to expire automatically without a congressional repeal vote once the President certifies that the eight conditions have been met by the Syrian government for two consecutive years.⁷The two-year requirement means the Act will remain in force at least until 2027. The bill also removes the two-year limit on humanitarian exemptions, granting the president authority to indefinitely waive the Act for NGOs delivering humanitarian assistance. Other provisions relate to Syria’s financial services sector (see Table 1).

Table 1: Syria Sanctions Accountability Act of 2025

Section	Provision	Details
Section 2	FinCEN briefing on Commercial Bank of Syria	Within 360 days, the Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) ⁸must brief Congress on: The impact of the regulatory relief granted to the Commercial Bank of Syria in May 2025,⁹including an assessment of whether the relief advanced US national security or foreign policy objectives A recommendation on whether to continue exceptive relief (a temporary exemption from sanctions) or to revise any finding with respect to the Commercial Bank of Syria will be provided.¹⁰
Section 3	US role at IMF & World Bank	Instructs the US Executive Directors at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the US voice and vote to: Restore sound data reporting and regular economic monitoring in Syria Provide technical assistance for the Government of Syria to improve financial connectivity and strengthen measures, consistent with international standards, regarding anti-money laundering, weapons non-proliferation, and anti-corruption Develop a strategy to address priorities for economic growth in Syria.
Section 4	EXIM Bank reassessment	Directs the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) to reassess its country limitation on Syria (a restriction on EXIM financing in higher-risk markets) and report to Congress.
Section 5	Amendments to Caesar Act	Proposes major amendments to the Caesar Act by: Eliminating all time limits on sanctions waivers and suspension Removing language that ties suspension of sanctions to actions by the Governments of Russia and Iran, focusing instead solely on the Syrian government¹¹ Adding two new conditions the Syrian government must meet to suspend the Caesar Act: (1) combat illicit captagon production and international illicit proliferation; (2) cease targeting or extrajudicial detention of religious minorities and actively protect them.

On 21 July, Representative Wilson criticized Lawler’s bill, saying: “A clean repeal of the Caesar Act is most in line with the President’s agenda to ‘give Syria a chance.’ Keeping Caesar on the books for years will only deter long-term reconstruction which could help ISIS resurgence.” On 22 July, Wilson added: “HR 4427 in its current form is not the right approach forward and does not align with President Trump’s agenda for Syria.”

The Syrian American Council, the Syrian Emergency Task Force, and the Syrian American Alliance for Peace and Prosperity urged all members of Congress to vote against this bill. They argue that adding new conditions—focused on captagon trafficking and minority protection—is unnecessary and serves to further chill economic recovery efforts and foreign investment in Syria while hampering the Trump administration’s policy. They note that the US already possesses tools to address these issues through existing mechanisms, including EO 13894, the Magnitsky Act, the Captagon Act,¹²and the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act of 2023. Similarly, regarding the arbitrary detention of religious minorities, EO 13589, the Magnitsky Act, the Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012, and the International Religious Freedom Act already provide such authority.

Critics also contend that the bill contradicts President Trump’s EO 14312, which formally ended the Syria sanctions program and shifted US posture from isolation to engagement. They warn that this bill would lock in tougher sanctions, deter investors, and undermine reconstruction and refugee return. While the bill grants the president greater waiver flexibility, the Act’s continued existence sends a chilling signal to investors and international partners. Major investments already pledged may be affected due to the Caesar Act’s secondary sanctions.¹³

Sanctions already deter foreign direct investment and reconstruction. Keeping Caesar sanctions intact until at least 2027 would likely reduce investment and slow refugee return.

Status

Upon introduction, the bill—which has no cosponsors as of 22 September 2025—was referred to the House Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, and Judiciary. It passed a vote in the House Financial Services Committee in July 2025 but has not reached the House floor. The version of the bill passed by the Committee amended the ninth condition introduced by Representative Lawler, as proposed by Representative Brad Sherman (D-California), to impose a positive obligation that the “Syrian government is not failing to meet its responsibility to protect minorities.” The bill’s advancement through committee and bipartisan amendments suggest growing momentum, but it could have also been a reflection of the lack of clarity many Members of Congress feel about the Administration’s direction, especially immediately following the violent events of Sweida in July.

Committee dynamics remain important. If the Financial Services Committee leadership remains focused on Ukraine- and China-related sanctions, HR 4427 could languish. Without a Senate companion bill, it also lacks the cross-chamber momentum needed for enactment. Still, growing concern over captagon trafficking—now recognized as a regional destabilizer—has increased Washington’s interest in sanctions that incentivize anti-narcotics cooperation. Section 5, which ties waivers to Syria’s performance on captagon suppression and human rights, may appeal to policymakers seeking results-based conditionality. Given that the bill has stalled and not received any momentum as of October 7, 2025, it is not likely to succeed.

Senate Amendment 3899 to S 2296—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (119th Congress)
Policy Rationale
Senators Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) and Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland) introduced an amendment to the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would suspend Caesar Act sanctions, subject to new conditions. The amendment requires the president to certify to Congress every four months that Syria’s government:
1. is committed to eliminating ISIL and other terrorist threats and has joined the Global Coalition
2. is providing security for religious and ethnic minorities including them in government representation
3. is maintaining peaceful relations in the region, including with Israel, and is taking action against groups threatening regional security
4. is not knowingly financing, arming, or sheltering individuals or groups hostile to US national security or to US allies and partners in the region
5. has removed, or is in the process of removing, foreign fighters from the Government of Syria, including those in state and security institutions
6. is in the process of investigating and has committed to prosecuting individuals or entities that have committed serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights since 8 December 2024, including those responsible for the massacre of religious minorities.
The amendment stipulates that Caesar sanctions should “snap back” if the Administration fails to certify compliance for two consecutive 120-day periods. Enforcement ultimately rests with the president.

Some conditions appear relatively easy to meet. For instance, Syria recently announced in Amman a tripartite roadmap with Jordan and the US to address the As-Suwayda crisis and has allowed the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the events in Sweida, thereby aligning with conditions 2 and 6. However, the amendment raises the stakes by threatening to reimpose Caesar sanctions if Damascus fails to follow through.

Condition 1 is also relatively straightforward. The new Syrian government has pledged repeatedly to fight ISIL and has already been delivering on that promise. US Central Command recently visited Damascus to strengthen cooperation, underscoring US recognition of Syria’s track record. Conditions 1, 3, and 4 overlap with requirements for removing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation, meaning the administration will have to tell Congress that Syria has made progress on those fronts in order to end that designation.

Other conditions are far more difficult. Condition 5—removing foreign fighters from Syrian institutions—remains particularly sensitive for Damascus. The Trump Administration reportedly dropped this requirement months ago as part of its sanctions relief process and has largely avoided the issue since. Senator Graham’s push to revive this condition could reopen a divisive debate.

Condition 3 also poses challenges. It requires Syria to maintain peaceful relations with Israel even though the two states remain technically at war. Israel has refused to return to the 1974 armistice agreement, continues to occupy Syrian territory seized in 1967, and has expanded its military operations inside Syria while supporting separatist militias. As of September 2025, amid this tense relationship, there is nonetheless official ongoing dialogue between the two countries. Critics argue that placing the burden solely on Damascus, rather than on Israel, distorts the reality of the conflict and sets an unrealistic standard.

More broadly, critics argue that the amendment creates new conditions unrelated to the original Caesar Act. Instead of requiring Syria to meet the Act’s humanitarian and civilian-protection benchmarks—such as halting attacks on civilians, releasing political prisoners, and permitting refugee return—Senator Graham introduces conditions tied to counterterrorism, regional relations, and US security priorities, effectively repurposing the Act as leverage for his own policy goals. Opponents call this a misuse of Caesar, turning it into a blunt political tool rather than the sanctions framework Congress originally designed.

Status

The amendment by Graham and Van Hollen was introduced on 15 September 2025 and is pending Senate consideration. On 20 September 2025, a bipartisan political deal or understanding was announced that would provide for the repeal of the Caesar Act with a four-year monitoring period ensuring the Syrian government’s compliance with the same conditions outlined in Senators Graham and Van Hollen’s bill.

Geopolitical- and Security-Focused Bills

HR 256 (119th Congress) – Save America’s Valuable Energy (SAVE) Act
Policy Rationale
The bill, titled the “SAVE Act,” prohibits the sale of petroleum products from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to entities headquartered in Russia, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Venezuela. The measure has little practical relevance for Syria, since no evidence suggests Syrian entities have purchased or even sought SPR products. Its inclusion is largely symbolic, reinforcing Syria’s pariah status under US sanctions.¹⁴The bill imposes no new restrictions on private-sector energy firms but fits into a broader Republican effort to shield the SPR from sales to geopolitical rivals. That push gained traction after the Biden administration’s SPR drawdowns in 2022–2023 and has already produced bipartisan wins, such as HR 21 (118th Congress), which barred SPR sales to China and passed the House with some Democratic support. By grouping Syria with Republican priority targets like China, Russia, and Iran, the bill draws on an energy security narrative that could carry it forward, particularly if lawmakers attach it to a larger energy package.StatusRep. Stephanie Bice (R-Oklahoma) introduced HR 256 in the House on 9 January 2025, with co-sponsorship from seven Republican lawmakers.¹⁵The bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, where it remains as of September 2025.

S 1478 (119th Congress) – “Countering Wrongful Detention Act of 2025”
Policy Rationale
The bill gives the US government new tools to deter state and non-state actors from wrongfully detaining US nationals for political leverage. It proposes creating a new designation—similar to the State Sponsor of Terrorism label—called “State Sponsor of Unlawful Detention.” S 1478 addresses a bipartisan concern fueled by high-profile cases in Russia, Iran, and China. While Syria is not central to its intent, its inclusion once again underscores its pariah status. With senior bipartisan sponsorship and calendar placement, the bill has a strong chance of passing, either as stand-alone legislation or within a broader national security package. If congressional leadership prioritizes it, S 1478 could come to a vote before the end of 2025.StatusSenator James Risch (R-Idaho), ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S 1478 on 10 April 2025, with Senator Chris Coons (D-Delaware) as co-sponsor. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee the same day. On 5 June, the Committee ordered it reported favorably with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and on 18 June Senator Risch formally reported it without written report. That same day, the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar (No. 94),¹⁶where it remains as of 22 September 2025 with no further action.

HR 1327 (119th Congress) – Syria Terrorism Threat Assessment Act
Policy Rationale
The bill directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a comprehensive threat assessment of individuals in Syria affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) or Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) who may pose a threat to the United States. StatusRepresentative Morgan Luttrell (R-Texas) introduced HR 1327 in the House on 13 February 2025, with co-sponsors Representatives Andrew Ogles (R-Tennessee), August Pfluger (R-Texas), and J. Luis “Lou” Correa (D-California). That same day, the bill was referred to the House Homeland Security Committee and then to its Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.Luttrell, the bill’s primary sponsor, is a highly influential lawmaker and a close ally of Representative Michael Lawler.

On 10 July 2025, the Homeland Security Committee reported the bill. It was placed on the Union Calendar (No. 162),¹⁷and the House passed it the same day. This bill now awaits Senate action. If placed on the Senate calendar, it could pass before the end of 2025. According to GovTrack, the bill has a 37 percent chance of being enacted.

Legislative Status and Timeline

Six bills remain at the committee or subcommittee level. Two have been placed on chamber calendars—one has passed the House. None have passed both chambers or been presented to the President.

Bill	Introduced in: (Date) (By)	Committee/ Markup	On Calendar	Floor Vote	Received in Other Chamber
Amendment to HR 3838 (119th Congress) NDAA FY2026 (Wilson repeal language)	House Rules Committee (Sep 2025) (Wilson, SC)	Offered in House Rules Committee; rejected	n/a	n/a	n/a
HR 3941 (119th) Repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019	House (12 Jun 2025)(Wilson, SC et al.)	Referred to House Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services; no hearings/markup scheduled	No	No	No
S 2133 (119th) Senate Companion to HR 3941	Senate (18 Jun 2025) (Shaheen, NH; Paul, KY)	Referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee; no hearings/markup scheduled	No	No	No
HR 4241 (119th) Repealing Syria Sanctions	House (27 Jun 2025)	Referred to House Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services; no markup	No	No	No
HR 4427 (119th) Syria Sanctions Accountability Act of 2025	House (16 Jul 2025) (Lawler, NY)	Referred to House Financial Services (cleared markup 31–23), Foreign Affairs, Judiciary	No	No	No
S Amendment 3899 to S 2296 (119th) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026	Senate (15 Sep 2025) (Graham, SC; Van Hollen, MD)	n/a—Floor amendment	No	Senate has not yet considered it (as of 24 Sep 2025)	No
HR 256 (119th Congress) Save America’s Valuable Energy (SAVE) Act	House (9 Jan 2025)(Bice, OK)	Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce	No	No	No
S 1478 (119th Congress) Countering Wrongful Detention Act of 2025	Senate (10 Apr 2025) (Risch, ID; Coons, DE)	Referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee (10 Apr 2025); ordered to be reported favorably with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (5 Jun 2025); reported by Sen. Risch without written report (18 Jun 2025)	Senate Legislative Calendar No. 94 (placed 18 Jun 2025)	No	No
HR 1327 (119th Congress) Syria Terrorism Threat Assessment Act	House (13 Feb 2025) (Luttrell, TX et al.)	House Homeland Security Committee; referred to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; reported 10 July 2025	House Union Calendar No. 162 (House)	Passed House (10 July 2025)	Senate (Awaiting Action)

Conclusion

Congress is not debating a single bill, but three competing futures for US policy in Syria. The repeal camp calls for a clean break, arguing that the old tools no longer fit the new reality. Others seek to amend, wary of the vacuum a full repeal might create. A third group is steering the debate toward stability and security, anchoring US policy in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics.

The Caesar Act was designed to hold the Assad regime and its enablers accountable for war crimes. With the Assad regime gone, that central rationale no longer aligns with current realities. As other policy tools exist for accountability, repeal bills have shifted focus toward redefining the purpose of US sanctions in Syria. Still, they remain politically precarious because of uncertainties in regime replacement and the reputational risks of a premature repeal.

Critics warn that repeal is not without risks. Lawmakers passed the Caesar Act to target Assad, not HTS—an offshoot of al-Qaeda and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until July 2025. Yet HTS now governs most of Syria. If Congress removes sanctions without replacing them with a tailored accountability framework for the new government, observers could interpret that move as acquiescence to formerly designated terrorists now in power.

Congress faces a set of political and strategic choices while also considering the implications of maintaining the current framework. A political deal to repeal Caesar Act sanctions would reopen Syria as a serious business prospect for the private sector. Keeping the Act in place and layering on new conditions would represent a shift from its original purpose. For that reason, some lawmakers view repeal as a potential reset for US engagement, contingent on broader diplomatic and economic developments.

The legislative process remains fluid. Standalone repeal measures are stalled in committee, while amendments to the must-pass FY2026 NDAA represent the most immediate vehicle for sanctions changes. Other security-oriented bills with Syria provisions, such as HR 1327 and S 1478, have advanced further procedurally and are more likely to reach floor consideration.

Alignment with the administration is uneven. Bills that most closely reflect President Trump’s stated position of ending sanctions—HR 3941, S 2133, and HR 4241—have seen little movement. By contrast, the measures with the greatest procedural traction, such as HR 4427 and Senate Amendment 3899, would retain or repurpose the Caesar framework by adding new conditions, diverging from the administration’s Executive Order 14312 of 2025. This divergence highlights the limited clarity of White House influence on the current legislative path.

These debates are unfolding while Congress remains consumed with ending the government shutdown that began on 1 October 2025.

R – Republican; D-Democrat
Representative Wilson was joined by seven other original cosponsors: Jimmy Panetta (D-California); Marlin Stutzman (R-Indiana); J. Luis Correa (D-California); Jack Bergman (R-Michigan); Pramila Jayapal (D-Washington); Anna Paulina Luna (R-Florida); and Mike Levin (D-California). Additional cosponsors joined later: James C. Moylan (R-Del. at large, Guam); André Carson (D-Indiana); Maxine Waters (D-California); Rashida Tlaib (D-Michigan); Joyce Beatty (D-Ohio); Victoria Spartz (R-Indiana); Steve Cohen (D-Tennessee); Erin Houchin (R-Indiana); Johnny Olszewski (D-Maryland); Rep. Lori Trahan [D-Massachusetts]. Abraham Hamadeh (R-Arizona) supported the bill but then withdrew.
Hamadeh, who is of Syrian descent and grew up in a mixed Druze–Muslim household, likely distanced himself in response to reports of mass violations against the Druze community committed by government and pro-government militia forces. On 21 July 2025, he issued the following statement: “The barbaric violence against the Druze community in Syria must end immediately. The United States wants Syria to succeed, but bloodshed, senseless violence, and division is not the path forward.” Hamadeh met with Syrian government officials multiple times afterwards, including in Damascus in August, and with Foreign Minister Shaibani in Washington, DC, in September.
Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, the author of the X post linked, is Policy Chief at the Syrian American Council.
Shaheen serves as the ranking member (the minority party’s lead) on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Paul is a leading non-interventionist voice within the Republican Party (colloquially “the GOP”).
Ending use of airspace to target civilians; ending sieges and allowing humanitarian access, freedom of travel, medical care; releasing political prisoners and allow international access to prisons; stopping the targeting of medical facilities, schools, and residential areas; complying with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); permitting safe, voluntary refugee return; taking verifiable steps toward accountability and justice for war crimes.
The new provision allows the Caesar Act to automatically expire 30 days after the president informs Congress that the Syrian Government has met all conditions in the bill for 2 consecutive years.
FinCEN is a bureau of the US Department of the Treasury. The Director of FinCEN is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and reports to the Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. FinCEN’s mission is to safeguard the financial system from illicit activity, counter money laundering and terrorist financing, and promote national security through strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence.
Under Section 5318(a)(7) of Title 31, US Code.
Under Section 5318A(a)(1) of Title 31, US Code.
For instance, the bill strikes the reference to the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Iran in the Caesar Act’s provision that currently reads: “Areas besieged by the Government of Syria, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of Iran, or a foreign person described in Section 7412(a)(2)(A)(ii) are no longer cut off from international aid and have regular access to humanitarian assistance, freedom of travel, and medical care.”
HR 6265 (117th)
These include projects such as: Qatar’s $7 billion energy/power deal with Syria; Saudi Arabia agreement in investing nearly $9 billion in infrastructure, housing, and more; UAE’s signing of a $800 million agreement to develop Syria’s Port of Tartous.
Syria is still designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Including: James Baird (R-Indiana); David Valadao (R-California); Dusty Johnson (R-South Dakota); Burgess Owens (R-Utah); Tracey Mann (R-Kansas); John Rutherford (R-Florida); Byron Donalds (R-Florida).
Countering Wrongful Detention Act of 2025, S 1478, 119th Cong., placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No. 94, 18 June 2025.
Unlike the Senate, the House uses two calendars: the Union Calendar for bills involving money or property (and in this case Homeland Security because of a foreign aid connection), and the House Calendar for everything else.