Aoun al-Dadat Crossing: The Intersection of Exploitation and Lawlessness

The October 2024 return of thousands of Syrian refugees from Lebanon brought renewed attention to the Aoun al-Dadat crossing, a site that exemplifies the exploitation and lawlessness pervasive in Syria’s fragmented governance. Located between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled Manbij and Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled Jarabulus, the crossing has become notorious not only as a transit point for displaced individuals but also as a hub for human trafficking and systemic abuse. Displaced families, stranded for days in harsh conditions, fell victim to extortion by Zakaria al-Mousa—known as Zakouri—his son Hazza, and their group, who wield significant control over the crossing.

Citing these abuses, the Türkiye-affiliated Syrian Interim Government’s Military Police temporarily closed the crossing, further compounding the suffering of the stranded returnees. While the crossing later reopened, it closed again on 1 November to Syrians returning from Lebanon, though some families are occasionally allowed to cross it. With no other alternatives, many were forced to turn to smugglers operating under Zakouri’s oversight.

A Strategic Crossing Turned Exploitation Hub

The geographic significance of Aoun al-Dadat stems from its position near the Turkish border, linking territories controlled by opposition factions, the SDF, and the regime. Originally intended as a vital passage point for humanitarian aid, commercial trade, and civilian movement, it has devolved into a flashpoint of exploitation. Its strategic location has attracted not only legitimate activity but also rampant human trafficking, extortion, and abuse, exacerbating the suffering of those seeking safety or opportunity across Syria’s divided regions.

Zakouri, leveraging his position as a local powerbroker, has transformed the crossing into a personal fiefdom. The town’s main square, originally known as ‘Aoun Square,’ is now commonly called ‘Zakouri Square.’ According to interviews with locals and journalists, travelers—many fleeing conflict or economic hardship—face exorbitant fees to secure passage, ranging from $150 to $200 per person. Those who cannot pay endure detention, blackmail, and inhumane treatment.

Local testimonies—collected by the authors—reveal the hardships faced by those stranded in this area. One mother and her daughters, harassed by Zakouri’s group, were forced to flee on foot through dangerous terrain to find safety. Another man, separated from his wife at the crossing, waited helplessly as she was detained in degrading conditions until a bribe could be paid.

 Beyond human security, the crossing is a central node for smuggling operations. Goods such as fuel, medicines, and even vehicles flow through nearby smuggling points like Al-Halunji and Tukhar al-Saghir, which are overseen by Zakouri’s network.

Photo of Zakaria Al-Mousa, known as Zakouri, (left) and his son, Hazza Al-Mousa, known as Hazza Zakouri (right).

The Web of Corruption and its Implications

Zakouri’s power stems not only from being a powerful local tribesman from Aoun al-Dadat village but also from his shifting alliances with operatives from SDF and SNA factions. Although Aoun al-Dadat lies within SDF-controlled territory, Zakouri often enjoys relative freedom of action, reportedly providing financial incentives to maintain SDF’s tacit approval, according to interviews with residents. In return, the SDF has intervened to protect Zakouri’s operations during disputes with SNA-affiliated factions, reflecting a mutual dependence built on shared interests. Zakouri’s influence is further bolstered by his al-Awni Travel Company, which facilitates transport across conflict lines. The company assures its customers safe passage with escort services and protection from arrest at checkpoints, indicating its established connections with the security forces and authorities controlling the areas it traverses.

Similarly, Zakouri maintains ties with SNA factions that control the opposition side of the crossing. Local sources reported that groups such as the Sultan Murad Division, the 112th Brigade, and the Northern Brigade benefit from Zakouri’s payments and tribal connections, ensuring their cooperation and protection for his smuggling operations. These relationships create a network of power and influence that allows Zakouri to operate with impunity despite the frequent closures and reopenings of the crossing by the SNA’s Military Police. Such closures do not always affect Zakouri’s operations due to his control over adjacent smuggling routes.

The lawlessness at Aoun al-Dadat has far-reaching economic and social consequences. Merchants transporting goods are forced to pay bribes, increasing prices and deepening economic instability and fragmentation. At the same time, the lack of protection and widespread abuses at the crossing result in severe human rights violations.

Aoun al-Dadat epitomizes everything wrong with the status quo and how various control areas engage. At its core, such crossings endure because de facto authorities—the SDF and the SNA—refuse to engage formally, leaving low-level actors dominating the scene.