Beijing’s Empty Promises to Damascus

From the outset of the Syrian conflict in 2011, China has opted not to engage militarily as Russia and Iran have done. Instead, China’s involvement in favor of the Assad regime has been characterized by openly supportive statements politically and economically.

Beijing, which has leveraged its veto power in the United Nations Security Council ten times to bolster the Assad regime, has used the veto power only 19 times since it regained its seat in 1971, highlighting its unwavering political stance. This political support lent Russia, which used its veto to support Assad even more frequently, legitimacy on the international stage.

While political support has been forthcoming, China’s economic promises to Syria have rung hollow, raising questions about their sincerity, particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Damascus formally joined in January 2022. Despite high-profile promises and declarations of “strategic partnership,” the reality suggests that China’s investments in Syria are more rhetoric than substance. This is immediately apparent from eyeballing the number of Chinese visitors to the country, which crashed following the conflict, with minor movements relating to the security situation or the global pandemic.

The potential for investment in Syrian railroads and ports aligns with China’s broader ambitions to expand its global economic footprint. Syria’s location along the Mediterranean is favorable for China’s BRI, which aims to enhance trade routes connecting Asia with Europe. Nevertheless, tangible Chinese investments have been conspicuously absent despite strategic significance.

China is more accustomed than Western companies to investing in risky environments, such as those in Africa. Yet according to our review of the Syrian Gazette, virtually no Chinese companies have opened a branch in Syria since 2011, suggesting the country is too risky even by Chinese standards.

Instead, Chinese nationals have been establishing Syria-based companies, especially after the regime’s military advances and the defeat of ISIS by the end of 2017. Our review of the incorporation documents of these companies suggests that most have not been licensed in the sectors that require an upfront investment—such as natural resource extraction and construction—reflecting a tendency to prioritize quick profits, especially in the trade sector. Regardless, our tracking of the online footprint of these businesses suggests that the vast majority did not take off at all.

Several factors underscore the lack of Chinese investment, with the foremost being the country’s political and security instability. Although the intensity of conflict in regime-controlled areas has lessened in recent years, and Bashar al-Assad appears to have achieved a modicum of political stability, Syria still ranks as the fifth most fragile country in the world, highlighting the unsustainability of the status quo.

Despite these challenges, Chinese officials have continued to express interest in Syria’s reconstruction. In recent years, statements from Chinese leaders have emphasized their commitment to supporting Assad’s government in revitalizing the war-torn nation. During a congratulatory telegram sent by President Xi Jinping following Assad’s re-election in 2021, he asserted that China would provide “all possible assistance” to Syria in combating COVID-19 and revitalizing its economy. Moreover, China’s September 2023 announcement of a “strategic partnership” with Syria was lauded as an important milestone in bilateral relations.

However, despite these high-profile commitments, the outcomes remain elusive. For instance, while Chinese tech giant Huawei expressed interest in rebuilding Syria’s telecommunications system in 2015, no substantial progress has been made. Similarly, China’s $2 billion pledge in 2017 for creating an industrial park in Syria to host Chinese companies did not yield tangible results. Finally, despite an agreement on economic cooperation signed in 2020 between China and Syria, which included a Chinese donation for humanitarian projects, broader economic engagement has not materialized.

China’s long-term vision for Syria appears focused on patiently waiting for conditions to improve before making substantial investments. Beijing’s reluctance to enter the Syrian market, however, might cost it some long-term losses to Assad’s other backers: Iran and Russia, both of whom have established strong economic footholds. Most importantly, Russian dominance over key resources, including phosphate and hydrocarbons, further limits opportunities for Chinese companies. For example, Syria’s ports have been contracted out to foreign companies for at least three decades.