Syria in the Crosshairs: US Policy in the Trump Administration

External contribution from Steven Heydemann, Professor at Smith College and Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution

Donald Trump’s pending return to the White House has been greeted by triumphal acclaim from his supporters and nervous apprehension from his critics. Both anticipate an administration poised to challenge established conventions in Washington, with a willingness to depart from democratic norms, reinterpret constitutional principles, and reject the liberal internationalism that has characterized US foreign policy since WWII. What Trump’s transactional worldview means in practice remains unclear, but Syria is likely to test his administration’s foreign policy. With US troops on the ground, strained Iran–Assad relations, and Israel targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, Syria could set the tone for his broader Middle East strategy.

If we take Trump’s nominees for key national security and foreign policy positions as an indicator of his administration’s approach, Syria policy will be sharply contested by appointees with dramatically different views. His picks for Secretary of State, Senator Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor, Representative Mike Waltz, are on record as strong advocates of the US troop presence in eastern Syria. Former Trump appointees rumored to be in line for key Middle East roles in the White House, such as Joel Rayburn, may bolster the position of those who want to see US forces remain. In contrast, Trump’s nominee for Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, is notorious for her criticism of US involvement in Syria, opposition to the presence of US forces, and a pattern of positive statements about both Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Fox News talk show host and National Guard veteran Pete Hegseth, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Defense, has a thin record on Syria but embraces Gabbard’s skepticism of US military intervention in the Middle East. In a 2018 phone call to Hegseth’s talk show, Trump affirmed his intent to withdraw US forces with Hegseth cheering him on. Influential voices, such as Elon Musk and Trump’s son Donald Jr. and other informal advisors, are aligned with the “peace at any price” faction of Trump’s inner circle, which advocates for US withdrawal.

Whatever the final composition of Trump’s national security team—Gabbard and Hegseth might not survive confirmation hearings—Trump himself will have the final say. His views on Syria have changed little from his first term as president and his selection of loyalists for key positions means he is unlikely to face pushback from within, not least because so many former critics, including Rubio, have transformed themselves into Trump loyalists.

In the years since leaving the White House, Trump’s Syria calculus has become more complicated. How might Syria fit into a revived “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran? Will his unconditional support for Israel bump up against his apparent interest in ending conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon if ceasefires limit Israel’s actions in Syria? Answers to these questions are as likely to be determined by Trump’s gut instincts and impulsiveness as by input from advisors. For this reason, taking lessons from his first term are instructive for what lies ahead. Five key lessons stand out.

First, Trump tends to prioritize quick wins, focusing on issues he perceives as straightforward or easily achievable. Second, Trump is known to encourage competition among his advisors, often rewarding those who are most aligned with his preferences. This will encourage what might be called testing behavior by those seeking influence and currying favor, not only within his administration but among foreign actors, as well: strategies to tease out the most effective channels for influence within a fractured and chaotic policy process, whether formal or informal, will be the norm. Third, we can anticipate a likely return to the performative diplomacy that Trump favors, focusing on high-profile moments, such as meetings with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un or withdrawing from the JCPOA, rather than engaging in the prolonged effort of traditional diplomacy. Fourth, Trump’s favorable relationships with strongmen are likely to enhance the influence and access of figures such as Putin, Orban, Erdoğan, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed of the UAE (MBZ), and Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Fifth, Trump’s skepticism of executive branch institutions suggests that, even with loyalists in the State Department, his administration is likely to further centralize foreign policy decision-making within the White House, continuing a trend seen in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

At this point, we can only speculate about how these factors might shape Trump’s Syria policy. Yet it is not far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which Trump invites Putin and Erdoğan to establish a condominium over northeast Syria—perhaps including a Russian security presence to address the concerns of Kurds and their US supporters—moves quickly to withdraw US forces, and identifies conditions that Assad would need to meet to trigger some measure of sanctions relief, with support from the Republican majority in Congress, including members who previously opposed normalization, such as Lindsey Graham. Such conditions could include steps reflecting the priorities of MBS and MBZ regarding narcotics smuggling and reducing Iran’s influence in Syria, as well as those of Orban and other European and regional leaders regarding the repatriation of Syrian refugees. What’s in it for Trump? His remarks on Syria’s oil suggest he may demand preferential treatment for friendly US oil firms in exchange. At the same time, while quick wins in Lebanon and Gaza are clearly high on Trump’s Middle East agenda, the likelihood of him moving to restrict Israeli actions in Syria remains low.

None of this may materialize, of course. What is certain is that Syria policy, like many other pressing issues, will likely reflect the same unpredictability, internal conflicts, and uneven management seen during Trump’s previous term. Some observers of Trump’s campaign argue that his administration could be more orderly this time, benefiting from years of planning and preparation by former appointees. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, predictions of a disciplined administration should be met with caution. This time, there may be fewer checks on Trump’s decisions, with a more compliant Congress—at least through the 2026 midterm elections—a weakened intelligence community, and diminished institutional safeguards. 

These factors do not bode well for American diplomacy in the next four years, whether on Syria policy or other critical foreign policy challenges.