The Interview: Fadi Dayoub: Executive Director of Local Development and Small-Projects Support and member of the Syria Resource Group, a brain trust of experts working on policy recommendations related to international assistance to Syria.

Can you tell me more about the position paper, opposing the UN’s draft Early Recovery Strategy for Syria, that you’re encouraging Syrian organizations to sign?

A: So far over 40 organizations, both large and small, and a mix of humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors have signed it. Notable signatories include SAMS, Syrian Forum, SCM, and SLDP. The paper, initially drafted in April in response to a UN strategy proposal, aims to establish a unified Syrian stance on early recovery—something we currently lack. Progress has been slow due to UN revisions and ongoing feedback from Syrian groups. During the lengthy negotiations, it became evident that the UN was stalling rather than genuinely addressing the different inputs. While some humanitarian partners were initially cautious and tried to avoid confrontation, mounting frustration eventually led to a stronger, more assertive stance.

Q: Is the latest draft of the UN’s Early Recovery Strategy final, and has it gone through a genuine consultative process?

 A: Yes, it’s now finalized. It was sent to the SSG and presented at the UN Security Council (the Strategic Steering Group is a committee established by UN-OCHA to strategize humanitarian responses in Syria. It consists of seven members: four representatives from international NGOs and three from Syrian NGOs, each representing a different control area in Syria); but this so-called “consultative process” was inadequate. While the UN claimed to consult through the SSG, only three of the seven SSG members are Syrian NGOs representing only the humanitarian sector. This doesn’t align with early recovery’s broader goals. Additionally, the UN gave SSG members just two weeks to provide comments, which were largely ignored. Though two Syrian pen holders were appointed for the drafting, they had minimal involvement. This top-down approach failed to include Syrians’ perspectives, undermining the credibility of the process as a genuine consultation.

Q: So who exactly did they officially consult in this process? You mentioned the SSG, but were there others involved?

A: The official consultation was limited solely to the SSG. The UN’s draft was presented to the SSG with no prior input from its members. Though internal workshops and consultations were held afterward, the pen holders appointed for input were asked only to review an already updated draft, rather than co-drafting it. Despite repeating their feedback, many of their suggestions went unaddressed in the final draft.

The workshops were limited to the SSG members and didn’t include non-humanitarian actors, which made it difficult to form a comprehensive early recovery strategy. The primary improvements are minor; they added terms like “social cohesion,” “rule of law,” and “accountability,” but with no actionable plans attached. The approach remains largely humanitarian-focused, which doesn’t address the forward-looking, structural needs of Syria’s early recovery. Fundamental aspects, such as building institutions and planning for national rather than international ownership, are missing. A truly inclusive early recovery requires a strategic framework that moves beyond immediate needs and considers long-term systems, policies, and societal reconstruction, which this draft lacks.

Q: If the current approach is primarily needs-based, like traditional humanitarian aid, why is the UN establishing an Early Recovery Trust Fund?

A: The Trust Fund serves two main purposes. First, it formalizes and centralizes early recovery projects that have been happening on the margins for years. This framework makes early recovery a core strategy, giving the UN an official structure to defend and expand these efforts. Second, it opens the door for new donors, especially those who might otherwise hesitate due to sanctions. By placing these projects within a UN-led framework, donors—particularly from Gulf countries—can contribute to infrastructure-related recovery without risking sanctions, especially those from the US.

Q: Do you think donor states—especially traditional ones like the US, Germany, and the EU—will actually contribute to the Early Recovery Trust Fund now that they’ve seen the final version?

A: Even after the final version traditional donors remain hesitant to contribute, expressing ongoing reservations and concerns about long-term risks if the Fund isn’t structured to protect Syrian interests. Early recovery is essential but requires careful structuring to prevent systemic issues. Governance concerns, such as the Resident Coordinator’s major role (the final say), which is a risk knowing the Assad regime’s sway over his operations, visa, nomination, etc., and the lack of Syrian representation, heighten fears that the Fund could have harmful effects without careful planning.

Q: What has been the UN’s reaction to your letter, and what role do you think the Syrian regime has played in shaping the UN’s approach to early recovery?

A: We haven’t sent the letter to the UN yet, as we’re finalizing signatures and determining the best channel [by which] to deliver it. However, we’re evaluating the most suitable approach now that the Early Recovery Strategy has been announced at the UN Security Council.

Regarding the Syrian regime’s role, it appears they’ve influenced the process by ensuring that the strategy is managed from Damascus, primarily by the Resident Coordinator, without in turn imposing any obligations on the Syrian government. This leaves the regime free to 14 shape interventions while limiting input from other Syrians, as demonstrated by the “whole-of-Syria” perspective—which the UN frames as providing services throughout Syria but which lacks a cohesive, unifying approach necessary for long-term recovery. The emphasis should shift to a “Syria-as-a-whole” perspective, focusing on unifying interventions that lay the groundwork for a cohesive national future. It is important at this stage to have a “Syrian vision” for approaching early recovery. In the position paper, which we invite Syrian organizations to sign, we call for efforts from Syrian civil society to start an elaborate discussion process to develop definitions, scope, approaches, and priorities that represent a broad consensus on how early recovery should be defined, designed, implemented, and monitored.