Sanctions in Transition: Proposing a Path Forward

The recent developments in Syria, with HTS spearheading the overthrow of the Assad regime in December, have brought renewed attention to the complex web of sanctions affecting the country. While much focus over the past few years has been on the sanctions against the Assad government and the ruling elite, the impact of sanctions on HTS has been comparatively overlooked.

Comparing Regime and HTS Sanctions

Though a growing number of observers have called for a review of the sanctions on HTS and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), Western officials remain rightfully cautious. They prefer to wait to see al-Sharaa’s words turned into actions and for a political transition—based broadly on UN Security Council Resolution 2254, adopted in 2015—to commence. UNSCR 2254 calls for a Syrian-led political transition, an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers, and UN-supervised elections, among other elements.

Cognizant of the need for reform or rebranding, al-Sharaa has made various efforts to project a more moderate image, supposedly worthy of sanctions delisting. These efforts include al-Sharaa using his real name in public statements, providing assurances of protection for religious and ethnic minorities, and downplaying his past association with ISIS and al-Qaeda. 

Though these signals have been welcomed, they’re not historically unfamiliar from interim leaders taking over their adversaries militarily to buy time and consolidate their grip on power. This has left most foreign governments waiting to see concrete actions.

The impact of sanctions

For decades, sanctions on the Assad regime—alongside the destruction wrought by a brutal armed conflict, pervasive mismanagement and corruption, a war economy, and various international counterterrorism (CT) and anti-money laundering (AML) measures—have severely impacted Syria’s economy. Together, these factors have restricted access to international markets, stifled private sector growth, and hindered economic recovery by elevating transaction costs and reducing investment opportunities. These measures have also strained humanitarian efforts, as compliance challenges inhibit the delivery of assistance. 

Meanwhile, the debate over easing sanctions on HTS has recently intensified. Current sanctions globally prohibit the direct or indirect provision of funds, assets, economic resources, or material support to the group or its leader, alongside travel bans to UN member states. Further compounding this, US criminal statutes explicitly ban any material support to HTS, designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). If enforced to their fullest extent, these sanctions could prove even stricter than those imposed on the Assad regime. HTS, once confined to Northwest Syria, now governs the majority of the country’s territory, encompassing approximately 85% of the population and serving as the backbone of the Caretaker Government (CG) in Damascus.

A balanced path forward

In considering the best approach to sanctions, the international community should balance multiple factors. First and foremost, the case can be made that most sanctions pertaining to the Assad regime should be lifted unconditionally, as their very purpose has simply ended. However, targeted sanctions on regime cronies and officers who have fled must be kept in place as part of broader efforts to facilitate accountability, a stance echoed by calls from prominent organizations. 

Easing sectoral sanctions on critical sectors such as banking, oil, and trade will provide immediate reprieve, revive economic activity, and support the return of displaced Syrians. Notably, two of the top three reasons Syrians cite for not planning to return are the “lack of livelihood/work opportunities” and “inadequate basic services”—issues that sanctions relief could significantly improve.

Since easing unilateral sanctions can be a lengthy process, often requiring legislative consent in addition to executive approval—and, in the case of the EU, consensus among different governments and bureaucratic horse trading—an interim and immediate step was taken by the US Treasury with the issuance of General License 24 (GL24) on 6 January 2025. In essence, it authorizes transactions with governing institutions in Syria after 8 December 2024, including activities related to the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy products and the processing of personal remittances, provided they comply with specific limitations.

Yet GL24 still falls short of allowing commercial transactions, which represent the backbone of Syria’s economic recovery. It also severely limits operations in the energy sector, with no provision for investments in or reconstruction of energy infrastructure. In sum, GL24 resembles more of a broad humanitarian exemption pertaining to the energy sector rather than an actual lifting of sanctions. 

As such, this move should provide only partial and temporary relief, which has historically been the case. Indeed, general licenses fail to address the broader economic challenges created by sanctions, be it in Syria or elsewhere. Their limited scope, complexity, and inability to accommodate diverse circumstances often render them insufficient. They also require meticulous compliance, frequently necessitating additional authorizations for specific transactions and activities.

For example, General License 22, issued in May 2022, authorized activities in certain economic sectors in non-regime-held areas of Northeast and Northwest Syria. While the license likely had a positive impact, its effects were difficult to discern. It facilitated legal investments and boosted economic engagement in these areas. But significant challenges persisted; Syria remained excluded from international banking, and confusion about the license’s scope led to continued overcompliance by foreign banks hesitant to process transactions. Uncertainty also lingered due to the license’s temporary nature.

Although it is now too late to broaden the scope of GL24—at least for the next six months—the West must make it clear that this measure serves only as an interim arrangement, implemented with the explicit understanding that full sanctions relief will follow as a procedural matter in due course.

Reevaluating sanctions on HTS

As for UN sanctions on HTS and its leader, however, they should be suspended in exchange for public commitment to policies agreeable to permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as inclusive governance, respect for human rights, democratic principles, ensuring the emerging networks in Damascus do not feed into further radicalization in the future, and resolving the issue of foreign fighters. Once these commitments have been achieved and the transitional period—currently estimated to be three to four years—is over, permanent sanctions relief should be provided.

Due to numerous political and procedural factors which will be discussed in our next issue of Syria in Figures, such a suspension will not be easy to achieve.

However, the responsibility does not rest solely with the Syrian side. Using sanctions relief as a bargaining tool for unrelated geopolitical demands—such as removing Russian troops or cutting ties with Iran—undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the sanctions framework. Such conditions, unrelated to the original reasons for imposing the sanctions, risk derailing recovery efforts and alienating Syrian stakeholders.

At the core of our proposed approach is the need for the countries willing to support Syria and its transition to realize the importance of working with the CG in Damascus and not ostracizing it, something which would only radicalize the current administration and push them to consolidate their current hold over Syria. This lesson must have been learned already from the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.