The Complexities of Lifting UN Sanctions on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

In the wake of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) unexpected rise to power in Syria, the international community faces a key question: Should UN-wide sanctions on a group long designated as terrorist be lifted? This process is highly complex, combining bureaucratic procedures with political and diplomatic considerations. There are multiple pathways for delisting, as outlined in this article. Understanding these processes can help craft potential scenarios and understand issues relating to the duration needed for delisting and how each political actor might leverage their position in the months—or perhaps years—to come.

The main body responsible for lifting sanctions on HTS is the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. This committee oversees the implementation of sanctions, including designations, delistings, exemptions, compliance monitoring, and reporting to the UNSC. It consists of representatives from all fifteen Security Council members. 

Any UN Member State, or any listed individual, group, or entity, may request delisting (see table at the end for a detailed breakdown of the delisting process). Requests are reviewed either by the independent Office of the Ombudsperson (established under Resolution 1904)—which assesses the case and submits a Comprehensive Report to the Committee—or directly by the Committee itself. In cases reviewed by the Ombudsperson, the report is translated into all official UN languages, and the Committee has fifteen calendar days to consider the recommendation before making a decision. The Committee operates by consensus, requiring all fifteen members to agree on the outcome of a delisting request. If consensus is not reached within 60 days, the matter escalates to the Security Council, where a decision is made by majority vote, including all five permanent members. 

Although the Committee’s consensus is not a strict prerequisite for delisting, it plays a crucial role in resolving cases efficiently by avoiding escalation to the UNSC. This means non-permanent Security Council members have limited influence compared to permanent members. 

Another ‘Political Process’

The political dimension of this process cannot be overstated, as the final decision ultimately rests on political will and diplomatic negotiations. Each permanent member of the Security Council holds veto power and will likely leverage it to shape the outcome.

The US acknowledges communication with HTS but remains cautious about its new role. Its stance, as articulated by former State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller before the Trump administration took office, emphasizes evaluating HTS’s actions rather than rhetoric before considering delisting. Washington could also push for the removal of more radical elements from the newly appointed Caretaker Government (CG), and particularly from the Syrian army, as a precondition. European nations face a similar dilemma, with the UK or France likely utilizing their veto power at the UNSC to extract more concessions from Syrian Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. The EU bloc, however, will most probably adapt whatever the UN decides, the same way it listed HTS only after the UN listing.

Eyes would probably be on Russia, who would be unlikely to simply abandon its interests in Syria. Its military bases in Tartous and Hmeimim are central to its power projection in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Despite years of hostility toward HTS, Moscow has rebranded the group as “Syria’s armed opposition” in state media and established direct contact channels with Damascus. On 29 January 2025 a high-level Russian delegation met with al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss “mutual interests.” While the terror listing was not officially on the agenda, Damascus will likely seek Russian support in the delisting process. Russia, in turn, holds economic leverage over Syria, complicating HTS’s engagement with Western nations who have repeatedly demanded that Damascus sever its ties with Russia—leaving al-Sharaa between a rock and a hard place. 

China also has a stake in Syria’s future. Beijing views the presence of Uyghur fighters within HTS’s ranks—particularly the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)—as a direct threat to its security in Xinjiang. China is unlikely to engage with the new Syrian government unless it receives assurances that these fighters will be excluded from power and possibly deported. However, recent appointments of TIP-linked fighters to the Syrian army have heightened tensions. Following these appointments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning declared that “[TIP] is a terrorist organisation listed by the UN Security Council” and that “The international community should ... resolutely crack down on it.” As one of the major potential players in the reconstruction sphere, China might also condition its cooperation with Damascus on the sidelining of the TIP, which al-Sharaa must be able to do upon consolidating his grip on power.

Dissolution: An Option?

The complexity deepens when considering possible strategies for delisting HTS. One approach could involve dissolving HTS and integrating its military factions into the Syrian army, which has already been underway. While this might seem like a practical workaround, history suggests otherwise. 

Several organizations have remained listed despite their dissolution and the absence of activities that would justify a terrorist designation. For example, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades continue to hold the same designation as HTS, even though they ceased operations years before officially disbanding in 2019. In practice, the impacts of continued listing would mostly apply to the individuals formerly affiliated with the group as opposed to the group itself. This includes Ahmad al-Sharaa (better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) and his newly appointed Syrian intelligence chief Anas Khattab.

The continued listing of al-Sharaa means he’s subject to a travel ban, restricting his movement to UN member states. However, the UNSC has already granted exemptions. On 31 January 2025, it approved a waiver allowing al-Sharaa to travel to Saudi Arabia for an official visit from 2–4 February 2025, while on 4 February 2025 another exemption was issued for his travel to Türkiye. A similar waiver was issued for Anas Khattab, permitting his trip to Türkiye on 15 January 2025 to address stabilization and humanitarian concerns, and a second waiver on 3 February 2025 to travel to Saudi Arabia to attend the Arab Intelligence Forum and perform Umrah. If applied strictly, what would have a much stronger impact on al-Sharaa and other group members is the ban on offering any form of support (including financial aid, logistics, or intelligence).

While the process of delisting HTS involves formal procedures, in practice it is a political decision shaped by the interests of the UNSC’s key players. Even if HTS meets the technical criteria for removal, the outcome will ultimately depend on negotiations among global powers, with the Security Council determining whether Syria’s new leadership is accepted on the international stage.

Table: UN Delisting Mechanisms—Overview of Procedures

Source: United Nations; compiled from various documents by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited.