The Interview: Adam Abdelmoula, UN Resident Coordinator & Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria

Q: How is funding tracking so far for HRP 2024?

A: Last year, HRP closed 2023 with about 40% funding. It’s unlikely we’ll reach this figure in 2024. The declining trend is one reason we thought we should do things differently; hence the idea of early recovery.

The current situation is unsustainable. There are people becoming chronically dependent on humanitarian handouts. Whether we admit it or not, the humanitarian industry has created this dependency, which essentially cripples productive capabilities by making people reliant on assistance year after year.

Money spent strategically and vertically could have a more transformative impact on the needs landscape. That’s why I think we need to control the funding by creating the ERTF and making it conditional on humanitarian community collaboration.

Q: Since the Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF) was first announced in March 2024, we haven’t seen much information. Could you provide us with an update?

A: The release delay of the final text of the ERTF is largely due to my insistence that this program should be for the whole of Syria. We owe it to the Syrian people to ensure the initiative is needs-based and covers the entire country. That’s why we’ve engaged in intensive dialogue with all Syrian partners over the past six months, working to ensure broad buy-in on the program.

My proposed ERTF management structure is unprecedented. It offers equal representation to NGOs and UN agencies. Donors will be involved in the Fund’s management. There will be no representation by the Syrian government or any other de facto authority, as this is based on our humanitarian mandate. To ensure that colleagues in northeast and northwest Syria feel comfortable, the regional humanitarian coordinator and I will co-chair the Fund.

The Fund’s secretariat will be located outside Syria—likely in Amman, Jordan. This will prevent any real or perceived influence by the Syrian government, and will automatically exclude Syrian nationals from being part of the secretariat, providing an extra safeguard.

Q: Do you anticipate significant funding, and do you think non-traditional donors will contribute? 

A: Some, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have inquired about the UN’s activities in Syria. But we haven’t actively engaged them at the capital level. We may do that before the end of the year, once we finish establishing the ERTF.

Initially we’ll rely on traditional donors who have already expressed interest in the program. The idea is simple: we want to start small, deliver tangible results, insulate the process from government influence, and make it people-focused. 

Q: Let’s have an open conversation about concerns from donors over evidence of aid diversion. In 2019–2020, we found that 23% of procurement funding went to companies owned by at least one sanctioned person. In 2021–2022, the share rose to 31%. How concerning is that for you?

A:  We don't want anyone to use the UN system to manipulate it. Anything that stands in the way of that must be avoided—this is a matter of policy. Many of you have more access to information about who’s who in Syria than we do—we lack that depth of information and the capacity to analyze it fully. But two key donors have expressed interest in a concept note we are currently circulating to develop our Risk Management Unit, which I intend to operate from outside the country.

Q: Since you assumed your role, the exchange rate gap has narrowed from nearly 40% to 7%. How did you secure those concessions?

A: It took a very long, multifaceted campaign, targeting various people at different levels, emphasizing the harm to citizens and the damage to donor confidence that was causing the dwindling funding for humanitarian operations. I made it clear that if this continued, I would be forced to go public. 

Initially the Syrian central bank said the difference in the exchange rate was used to fund subsidies. But when they eventually abolished those subsidies, we argued for closing the exchange rate gap. I also enlisted the support of Martin Griffiths, who served as UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator until June 2024; he visited Syria twice last year. 

Q: Our earlier research raised transparency concerns about the UN’s operations in Syria. It seems some information is not publicly shared, such as operations with The Syria Trust for Development. I understand operating in Syria has challenges, but how problematic is it for the UN to fund an organization led by the political leader’s spouse? What actions are being taken to improve transparency?

A: Any measure that erodes the confidence of donors should be of very serious concern to all of us.

The Syrian government’s humanitarian architecture is complex. The High Relief Committee that manages all aspects of humanitarian work in Syria represents at least five different entities, each defending its own turf. NGOs can be registered through as many as three different channels—The Syria Trust, the Ministry of Local Administration, the SARC, etc. To address this, I worked on a concept note for the creation of a single humanitarian coordination agency within Syria’s government. This is how things are done in every other country in the world. 

As I mentioned earlier, I don’t have all the details regarding who is funding which entities, but I am willing to look into it.