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What Does the Composition of Syria’s Caretaker Government Tell Us?
After the fall of the Assad regime, a Caretaker Government (CG) was hastily formed to fill the power gap, with the promise of a yet-to-be-formed and more permanent “interim” cabinet. The CG has struggled with several challenges, from legitimacy to governance capacity, and from economic stability to geopolitical positioning.
The composition of the CG and its senior appointments offers a picture of who holds power and the Interim President’s approach to governance. This article provides a data-driven analysis of the CG composition and senior government appointments. In total, we analyzed the backgrounds of 21 CG ministers and 154 senior appointees, collected between 8 December 2024 and 20 February 2025. Senior appointees include high-ranking public officials such as heads of public institutions and senior public servants.
We drew on a variety of publicly accessible materials, including official statements purported to be from the CG, often circulated via Telegram. We also weave in insights from well-informed field contacts and, wherever possible, triangulate the information against reputable media outlets and investigative reports.
Our findings suggest that:
The CG’s technocratic capacity is limited; most ministers were educated at local, lower-tier institutions and have no experience beyond the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).
Ministerial appointments are dominated by HTS-linked figures, with over-representation from territories formerly held by HTS.
A stark gender imbalance is evidenced by the complete absence of female ministers and only minimal representation among senior appointees.
The cabinet is overwhelmingly Sunni, offering little religious diversity.
Notably, the CG is significantly younger than Assad’s late government—a factor that may bring fresh perspectives but also raises concerns about the depth of experience.
Large gaps in the collected data raise questions about the societal notability of the appointees, especially outside the cabinet.
Qualification and Education Level: Technocratic Limitation
A government’s capacity to tackle challenges hinges on the depth and quality of its members. Most CG ministers hold undergraduate qualifications from Syrian institutions, while six pursued postgraduate studies (four from abroad). However, none appear to have attended top-tier universities—according to global rankings—and the educational backgrounds of three ministers remain unknown. Such limited insight into their academic backgrounds might raise questions about the practical competencies they bring, particularly to technical roles such as health, energy, and economics, which demand specialized knowledge and technical proficiency.
Advanced credentials alone don’t guarantee effective governance if ministers lack broader institutional experience. Notably, none of the ministers have served in established government bodies or formal political institutions outside the SSG.
Affiliation: SSG, HTS, and Military Ties
One barometer of the CG’s independence from HTS is the extent of its leaders’ affiliations with the SSG, often regarded as HTS’s administrative extension. Another barometer is independence from other opposition military factions. According to our data, 12 ministers have been affiliated with the SSG. By contrast, the current leadership seems more open to sharing power at lower levels with individuals unaffiliated with the SSG, with 138 senior appointees meeting that criteria. Although a varied base can broaden the government’s perspective and enhance its legitimacy, the strong HTS presence among ministers raises questions about the CG’s autonomy and policy latitude.


With regard to military affiliation, the figures reveal a considerable “unknown” category, especially among senior appointees. While a military background need not preclude effective governance, it points to the enduring role of armed actors in Syria’s policy and political realms. Taken together, these affiliations shape the internal dynamics of the CG and external perceptions of legitimacy, particularly as it attempts to chart a transitional path in a deeply fragmented society.
Gender Representation: A Stark Disparity
One clear measure of inclusivity is the degree to which women occupy leadership positions. In the CG, the numbers are stark: 100% of ministers are male. Among senior appointees, women account for only around 8%.

This gender gap raises concerns over the breadth of perspectives guiding Syria’s transitional governance. When women are absent or underrepresented at the highest levels, policy discussions risk overlooking issues that often affect half the population, which can impede the CG’s ability to respond effectively to the complex social and economic challenges facing the country and can weaken its support among women.
Religion and Sect: A Predominantly Sunni Government
Regarding religious inclusivity, the CG reveals limited variety: all 21 ministers are Muslim—primarily Sunni, with five of unknown sect. Senior appointments are similarly homogeneous, with only three Christians and one Druze among 154 officials.

Such a narrow representation of Syria’s heterogeneous society raises questions about the CG’s ability to represent all groups in governing the country. If such disparities persist, they may also trigger unrest as minorities feel excluded from decision-making.
Age Distribution: Fresh Blood?
The CG leadership is noticeably young, indicating a generational shift in how governance is approached in new Syria. The 14 ministers with known birth dates have an average age of 45.4 years, compared to 56.3 years in Assad’s last cabinet. The decade-plus difference might be viewed as both a risk and an opportunity. While age can reflect experience, younger generations may bring a fresh perspective. However, it remains to be seen how effectively this translates into policy formation and governance.
Geographic Distribution
Areas historically controlled by HTS are over-represented in the cabinet at the expense of other governorates—especially Latakia, Tartous, As-Suwayda, and Damascus, which were under the regime’s control before its fall. The underrepresentation extends beyond formerly regime-held areas to include areas currently controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa and parts of Deir Ezzor.

Visibility: Accessibility of Data
Transparency is a cornerstone of effective governance, yet our findings reveal notable gaps in the information available about new government officials. We classified the information relating to an official as “inaccessible” whenever the key details of date of birth, education, geographical origin, and religion or sect were all missing. According to our data, three ministers and nearly half of senior appointees lack this essential information, underscoring the limited societal notability of these individuals and raising questions about transparency and the criteria for their appointment. Six other ministers lack only their geographical origin; because of only the one missing variable, they were categorized as “accessible” for our purposes.

What Comes Next?
The significant gaps in representation identified in this article can in part be excused due to the extraordinary circumstances under which the appointments were made, attempting to fill a power vacuum that was created following Assad’s downfall.
As Syria approaches the transition to a new interim government, which has been in the making for weeks, Syrians and the international community may not look at the new appointments leniently if critical representation gaps persist. Will loyalty eclipse competence, or will we see a stronger focus on experience and technocratic capacity? Will there be improvements in transparency and a better balance in representation, be it geographically, religiously, or in terms of gender? Will traditional power structures persist, with HTS and its old guard continuing to dominate? Or will a more inclusive, more technocratic government emerge?
We will soon find out. Our next issue of Syria in Figures will map the new government and share the comparisons with you.
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