External Contribution: Dr. Lorenzo Trombetta, Senior Analyst and Author on Contemporary Syrian History

Syria and Lebanon: Borderlands as Catalysts for Development and De-escalation in the Levant

The rapid unraveling of half a century of Assad‑era dominance in Syria, combined with Hezbollah’s weakening in Lebanon, has created a rare strategic opening for both countries. If handled pragmatically, Damascus and Beirut could reframe bilateral relations around parity, sovereignty, and the effective sharing of abundant cross‑border resources, fostering a new era of shared socioeconomic development. Missed, the moment will simply prolong familiar cycles of fragmentation, predatory economies, and recurring violence.

A century of external interference, communal partitioning, authoritarian retrenchment, and violent spillovers has left the Levant fragmented and economically hollowed out. Local and transregional criminal networks involving narcotics, arms trafficking, and people smuggling now operate in symbiosis and competition with state actors on both sides of the border. This cycle has entrenched marginalization and repression, fueling radicalization, displacement, and illicit economies with Levant-wide consequences: violence, irregular migration, corruption, and instability.

Against this bleak backdrop, late summer brought cautious but meaningful change. After a prolonged wait‑and‑see phase, bilateral rhetoric in both Damascus and Beirut shifted to gestures of parity. In a statement, transitional Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa declared that he sought to turn a new page in relations between Syria and Lebanon, grounded in mutual respect. The same point was echoed by Lebanese Vice-Premier Tarek Mitri, tasked with handling Beirut’s relations with Damascus, who emphasized that Lebanese–Syrian relations had entered a new phase and were moving toward a new chapter. In this climate, technical commissions have convened in both capitals to address two long‑stalled dossiers: border management and the fate of thousands of Syrian detainees in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the topic of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has mostly been relegated to international organizations. Since early summer, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have led an initiative, in coordination with Beirut and Damascus, for the voluntary, gradual return of Syrian families, offering cash incentives and lifting fines for those who had been in Lebanon illegally. 

Yet skepticism still remains strong in both capitals. Many in Lebanon fear the repercussions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s dominance in Damascus and the influence it might exert over Lebanon’s Sunni communities. At the same time, Syrians’ fraught experience with Hezbollah—a key supporter of the deposed Assad regime—fuels deep resentment and mistrust, leaving many doubtful that Sharaa can fully distance himself from the movement or build genuine confidence with Beirut.

Cross-border clashes have underscored how security tensions directly damage local economies, heighten grievances, and undermine trust on both sides. The March border agreement brought these challenges into sharper focus, revealing two persistent problems. 

The first is foreign interference: regional and international actors—from Saudi Arabia and Iran to the US, Türkiye, and Russia—continue to shape border politics, often tying them to the unresolved Hezbollah question. Such involvement has deep historical roots, from colonial administrators to modern power brokers, and continues to dictate the terms of border management. 

The second problem is the persistence of a security-centric approach that treats the frontier primarily as a militarized zone rather than a space of long-standing social and economic interconnection. Since 2005, Western support for tighter policing, observation towers, and counter-smuggling operations has reinforced this logic. Yet Lebanese forces remain overstretched, Syrian forces struggle to assert control, and recurrent sectarian violence and displacement expose the limits of relying solely on security measures to manage a border deeply embedded in local socioeconomic life.

What is needed instead is a comprehensive socioeconomic strategy that views borderlands as economic corridors rather than sealed security zones prone to conflict. Lebanon depends on Syrian markets, transportation routes, and production capacity to export agricultural goods across the Gulf [states], yet many of these flows are dominated by captagon and other contraband. Smuggling of licit goods requires reforms in the management of essential commodities and the elimination of price differentials that sustain corruption. Although Damascus has begun to reduce subsidies on basic goods, distrust of authorities remains high, and many actors continue to bypass official channels.

By moving beyond a security-centric approach and embracing socioeconomic development, these borderlands could be radically transformed. Networks that now thrive on illicit activity could be redirected into legal trade, with new corridors—from Tripoli and Qleiaat airport through the Orontes Valley to Homs, or along the Damascus–Beirut axis via Zabadani, Serghaya, and the Bekaa—reconnecting ports, farmland, and communities. Such routes, though dormant today, hold the potential to disrupt trafficking, anchor legitimate commerce, attract investment, and build private-sector confidence. As Sharaa noted in August, developing cross-border infrastructure and shared resources offers a pathway to stability and cooperation between Syria and Lebanon. 

Remaining hopeful but cautious is advisable, given that this process presents multiple potential risks. If Syria and Lebanon can transform this rare window of political opportunity into institutionalized, mutually respectful cooperation—combining credible security measures with inclusive economic revitalization—they could weaken the criminal economies and identity-driven politics that have fueled decades of conflict. Conversely, failure to do so would likely lead to the reemergence of old patterns of predation and fragmentation, with the broader eastern Mediterranean region bearing the consequences.

In this delicate landscape, external actors also carry weight. Countries long embedded in Lebanon’s politics—notably the US, France, and Saudi Arabia—have rediscovered a stake in Syria and are now active on multiple fronts across both states. Their engagement, if calibrated carefully, could help steer bilateral efforts toward stability and reform. By supporting credible security arrangements and fostering economic revival, these powers would not only advance their own strategic interests but also contribute to a more resilient regional order.