By Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola and Natasha Hall

May 2026

At a Glance 

• EU Delists Syrian Defense and Interior Ministries Amid Broader Re-engagement Push — The EU removed Syria’s defense and interior ministries from its sanctions list while renewing sanctions against Assad-linked individuals and entities.
• Visa and Mastercard Return to Syria After Years of Isolation — Syria processed its first Visa and Mastercard electronic payment transactions in years as Damascus pushes to modernize its financial sector and expand digital payments.
• US Removes Syria from Counterterrorism Non-Cooperation List — Washington removed Syria from its list of countries “not cooperating fully” with US antiterrorism efforts.
• Russia Resupplies Syrian Air Base Through Sanctioned Shipping Networks — Russia used sanctioned vessels and logistics firms to deliver supplies to its military facilities in Syria.
• Vienna Trial of Former Assad Officers Highlights Gaps in Syria Sanctions Regime — Austrian prosecutors put two former Syrian security officials on trial for torture and war crimes, raising questions about why neither individual has been designated under Western sanctions frameworks.

EU Delists Syrian Defense and Interior Ministries Amid Broader Re-engagement Push

On 18 May, the EU removed Syria’s defense and interior ministries from its sanctions list while renewing sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the deposed Assad regime until 1 June 2027. The decision followed the bloc’s annual review of its Syria sanctions framework. In a statement, the Council of the European Union said it had delisted seven Syrian entities to support broader engagement with Syria. These included the defense and interior ministries, the General Intelligence Directorate (State Security), the Military Intelligence Directorate, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (previously one of the regime’s most powerful instruments of repression), and the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (HIAST), which had deep links to Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities. The intelligence agencies and the HIAST were delisted because the Syrian government moved to dismantle them immediately after toppling the Assad regime. The Syrian transitional government under Ahmad al-Sharaa consolidated the country’s domestic and foreign espionage operations into a single, centralized body called the General Intelligence Service (GIS).

CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The EU’s Syria sanctions regime is governed by Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, as amended (together, the “EU Regulations”). Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the EU suspended certain economic sanctions on Syria in February 2025—including restrictions on the energy and transport sectors, as well as the removal of four banks from the asset freeze list—before formally lifting them in May 2025 through amendments to the EU Regulations (the “EU 2025 Amendments”).

Those still listed remained subject to asset freezes and travel bans, and EU citizens and companies were barred from making funds available to them. In a statement, Syria’s foreign ministry said the removal of sanctions on the seven entities would support the country’s recovery and reconstruction efforts, strengthen state institutions, and reinforce stability. It also welcomed the renewal of sanctions targeting figures linked to the former Assad government accused of involvement in human rights violations against Syrians.

The decision marks another step toward greater EU engagement with Syrian state institutions on issues such as unexploded ordnance clearance, border management, and capacity building for security institutions. Brussels aims to facilitate stabilization, rehabilitation, and technical cooperation while supporting local governance and recovery efforts.

The move is also likely to reduce compliance and reputational risks for NGOs, donors, and implementing partners working with municipalities or quasi-state entities involved in service delivery, infrastructure rehabilitation, border management, and stabilization efforts. This is particularly relevant for EU-supported projects related to local governance, migration management, and basic service provision. At the same time, the EU renewed sanctions on Assad-linked individuals and other security and intelligence bodies (e.g., the Syrian National Security Bureau and the Fourth Armored Division of the Syrian Army), reflecting an effort to balance broader state engagement with continued pressure on networks associated with the former regime, repression, and illicit activity.

Syria Launches First Visa, Mastercard Payment Transaction in Years

On 9 May 2026, Syrian Telecommunications Minister Abdulsalam Haykal carried out a test electronic payment during an official event in Damascus marking the return of Visa and Mastercard services to Syria. The demonstration marked the first transaction processed through the global Visa and Mastercard networks in the country in years. Local payment solutions company Paymera conducted the transaction as part of efforts to expand electronic payments in Syria. The company provides QR code payments, point-of-sale (POS) devices, and payment card services. Paymera currently operates around 4,200 POS devices across Syria and plans to expand that number to 50,000 by the end of 2026.

CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Prior to the launch, the Central Bank of Syria issued a decision allowing local banks and electronic payment companies to deal with global payment companies such as Visa and Mastercard.

Shortly afterward, Qatar National Bank (QNB) Group said it would launch card payment acceptance and digital payment services in Syria.

In September 2025, the Central Bank also signed a memorandum of understanding with Mastercard International to cooperate on developing Syria’s digital payments system. The memorandum aims to develop the infrastructure of digital payment systems, exchange expertise, strengthen financial inclusion, and explore opportunities to expand access to basic financial services for millions of people.

The return of Visa and Mastercard marks a significant development for Syria’s financial sector. Vendors and merchants equipped with Paymera’s POS devices and linked to Syrian bank accounts can now process transactions made through Visa and Mastercard cards. However, the scale of adoption remains limited. Paymera has distributed only 4,200 POS devices so far, meaning that the use of electronic card payments remains relatively small, although the company plans to expand distribution and onboarding onto the new system.

At the same time, historically low public trust in financial institutions continues to pose a major obstacle to increasing the use of electronic payments. Previous attempts to introduce global payment services in Syria saw limited uptake, partly because high transaction fees made them inaccessible for many Syrians. Moreover, around 90 percent of the population remains unbanked, suggesting that the expansion of electronic payments will continue to face structural challenges.

Additionally, if the system is extended to cards linked to non-Syrian banks, the likelihood of transactions being successfully processed decreases. Syria is still widely viewed as a high-risk jurisdiction by international financial institutions, and some banks are likely to continue blocking transactions linked to the country. For now, the impact of these developments is expected to remain largely confined to the domestic market, rather than benefiting foreign visitors or expatriates expecting seamless use of international bank cards.

In theory, wider access to global payment systems could support trade, remittances, travel, and e-commerce. However, meaningful expansion will still depend on improvements to Syria’s banking infrastructure, regulations, cybersecurity, institutional capacity, and eventually its removal from the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list.

Syria Removed from US Counterterrorism Non-Cooperation List

On 7 May 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio removed Syria from the US list of countries “not cooperating fully” with US antiterrorism efforts. Pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act and Executive Order 13637, as amended, the Secretary certified to Congress that the following countries are not cooperating fully with US antiterrorism efforts: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Venezuela.

CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: By 15 May each year, the US State Department must identify governments “not cooperating fully” with US counterterrorism efforts. Syria’s previous designation under this provision denied it sovereign immunity in US courts for terrorism-related claims, exposing the Syrian government to lawsuits and additional penalties.

Although this designation is legally distinct from the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation, it can feed into broader internal debates over whether a country should remain on the SST list. As of May 2026, the SST list includes four countries: Syria, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. With the exception of Venezuela (and now Syria), every country currently designated as “not cooperating fully” also appears on the SST list, suggesting a correlation between the two classifications. Former designees on the SST list include Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.

The SST designation carries significant legal, political, and reputational consequences. It restricts access to US foreign assistance, limits preferential trade benefits, bans defense-related exports, and imposes controls on dual-use goods. Beyond these formal constraints, the designation generates strong indirect effects. Because Washington typically applies the SST label to states it treats as international outliers, businesses and NGOs often assume engagement is broadly prohibited—even where legal channels exist—creating a chilling effect on investment and commercial activity.

Syria’s removal from the “not cooperating fully” list creates a timely opportunity to revisit its status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Maintaining Syria on the SST list while simultaneously recognizing its cooperation with US antiterrorism efforts creates a contradictory policy position for the US. Although the two designations operate under separate legal frameworks, their overlap is politically significant.

Russia Resupplies Syrian Air Base Through Sanctioned Shipping Networks

In May, a cargo ship arrived in Syria to resupply Russia’s airbase in the country. The cargo ship Sparta departed St. Petersburg in March and arrived at the Syrian port of Tartous in May after Russian navy vessels escorted it for much of the journey, according to satellite imagery and US officials tracking the ship. The US Treasury Department has sanctioned both the Sparta and its owner, SC South LLC, as well as its parent company, Oboronlogistika LLC, which describes its primary business as providing logistics for the Russian Defense Ministry.

CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The mission marked Russia’s first major resupply operation to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024. According to US officials, the Sparta—whose owner Washington sanctioned for delivering weapons on behalf of the Russian Defence Ministry—transported equipment for Russia’s Khmeimim air base.

The shipment comes amid continued Russian economic engagement with Syria despite Western sanctions. Reuters reported in May that Russian oil shipments to Syria “have jumped 75% to about 60,000 barrels per day this year,” with much of the trade involving sanctioned vessels. In March 2025, Russia delivered diesel aboard the sanctioned tanker Prosperity, followed days later by the sanctioned tankers Aquatica and Sakina, which unloaded Russian oil at Syria’s Baniyas port. Open-source maritime researchers have also identified Tartous and Latakia as destinations for grain looted from occupied Ukrainian territories and transported aboard sanctioned or designated Russian vessels.

Russia has maintained talks with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa over the future of its military facilities in Syria, including the Khmeimim air base and the Tartous naval facility. According to Arab media reports, Syrian authorities are now converting Khmeimim into a training facility for the Syrian army staffed by Russian advisers.

The resupply mission highlights the extent to which Russia continues to preserve military and economic influence in Syria despite Assad’s overthrow. It also shows the limited deterrent effect sanctions have had on Russia’s logistical operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moscow continues to rely on sanctioned shipping networks and state-linked logistics firms to sustain military infrastructure and energy exports abroad.

Following Assad’s fall, former President Joe Biden conditioned the lifting of US sanctions on Syria on the removal of Russian military bases from the country. The Trump administration later abandoned that condition, and Trump subsequently ordered the unconditional lifting of sanctions on Syria.

Although Washington has shown some ambivalence toward penalizing countries that maintain economic ties with Moscow, congressional pressure to reimpose sanctions could intensify if Syria begins directly acquiring Russian weapons systems or engaging with Russia’s state-owned arms exporters, particularly following a future change in US administration. Some analysts argue that the current goodwill toward the Syrian government largely reflects Trump’s position, whereas another administration or Congress—potentially influenced by Israeli preferences—could adopt a far less accommodating stance. Syrian entities that purchase from or materially support Russian actors tied to the war in Ukraine could themselves become targets for sanctions.

Vienna Trial of Former Assad Officers Highlights Gaps in Syria Sanctions Regime

Two Syrian officers accused of torture and war crimes appeared in court in Vienna on 1 June after investigators spent years tracking them across Europe, where they had lived openly for more than a decade. Former brigadier general Khaled al-Halabi is the highest-ranking official from Bashar al-Assad’s regime to face war crimes charges before a European court. Authorities accuse Halabi of helping suppress protests in Raqqa between 2011 and 2013 while serving as head of State Security in the city.

Prosecutors said Halabi served in Syria’s intelligence services while also acting as a double agent for Israeli intelligence, and that his relationship with the Mossad helped him travel to Austria and apply for asylum in 2015. In April 2023, Austrian authorities opened a separate trial against five Austrians—four former officials from the BVT, Austria’s domestic intelligence agency, and a former asylum agency official—accused of abusing their positions to help procure asylum for Halabi under an arrangement involving the Mossad.

Austrian prosecutors also charged Musab Abu Rukbah, a former lieutenant colonel who headed investigations in Raqqa’s criminal police department before leading the Political Security office, an intelligence agency within Syria’s Ministry of Interior. According to the indictment prepared by the Vienna Public Prosecutor’s Office, both men are accused of sexual coercion, aggravated coercion, and inflicting bodily harm as part of efforts to suppress anti-government protests during the early years of Syria’s uprising. Both defendants pleaded not guilty. Austria granted asylum to both men, who have lived in the country since 2015.

CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Austria is trying former Assad regime officials for the first time, following similar prosecutions in countries such as Germany and Sweden. No international tribunal exists for crimes committed during Syria’s 12-year civil war, largely because Russia and China vetoed early efforts to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court. Since opposition forces overthrew the Assad regime in late 2024, Syria’s new government, led by former rebel leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, has begun prosecuting former Assad officials domestically.

For much of the war, however, individual states carried the burden of pursuing accountability through universal jurisdiction cases. Syrian activists, victims’ groups, and nonprofit organizations documenting war crimes drove many of these investigations by compiling evidence and supporting prosecutions abroad.

The Vienna trial may increase scrutiny over the absence of targeted sanctions against Halabi and Rukbah, despite both men having held senior positions within Syria’s security apparatus during a period marked by widespread abuses. The EU, UK, and US initially designed Syria sanctions primarily to disrupt the Assad regime’s military, intelligence, and financial networks. More recently, however, policymakers have increasingly used targeted sanctions as accountability tools linked to documented involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Their prosecution in Austria—particularly on charges related to torture, coercion, and the violent suppression of protests—may strengthen the evidentiary basis for future sanctions designations.

Governments now increasingly view individual sanctions not only as preventive measures, but also as symbolic and legal tools that publicly attribute responsibility, restrict international mobility, freeze assets, and reinforce broader accountability and documentation efforts. Neither Halabi nor Rukbah currently appears on major Western sanctions lists, despite the extensive sanctions architecture targeting members of Syria’s intelligence and security apparatus. Their prosecution may therefore expose gaps in existing designation frameworks, especially as governments rely more heavily on open-source investigations, court proceedings, and NGO documentation when making sanctions decisions.