By Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola
At a Glance
- Syria Reintroduces International Trade Financing for Petroleum Imports — The Central Bank arranged a letter of credit involving Aramco Trading and a major US bank, marking a significant step toward restoring formal trade finance.
- US Eases Restrictions on Defense Exports to Syria — Washington removed Syria from the ITAR policy-of-denial framework, allowing defense-export and brokering applications to be reviewed case by case.
- Syria Revises Its Domestic Terrorism List — Syrian authorities removed numerous individuals and entities from the domestic terrorism list while adopting an updated set of designations, reducing asset-freezing and compliance risks for previously listed parties.
- Japan Lifts Sanctions on Syrian Banks and State-Owned Entities — Tokyo removed restrictions on 16 Syria-linked entities, including four banks and several major state-owned companies.
- EU Court Upholds Sanctions Against Syrian Businessman Anas Talas — The General Court rejected Talas’s challenge to his EU listing.
Contents
- Syria Reintroduces International Trade Financing for Petroleum Imports
- US Eases Restrictions on Defense Exports to Syria
- Syria Removes Individuals and Entities from Domestic Terrorism List
- Japan Lifts Sanctions on Syrian Banks and State-Owned Entities
- EU Court Upholds Sanctions Against Syrian Businessman Anas Talas
Syria Reintroduces International Trade Financing for Petroleum Imports
On October 11, 2026, the Central Bank of Syria announced that it had arranged a letter of credit for the Syrian Petroleum Company to import petroleum products from a major international supplier. The transaction involves Aramco Trading and a major US bank. Under a letter of credit, a bank commits to paying an exporter once the exporter ships the goods and submits documentation demonstrating compliance with the agreed terms.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: The transaction follows efforts to reconnect Syria’s banking sector with the international financial system. On February 28, the Central Bank of Syria announced that it had reopened its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in coordination with the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, following efforts to meet compliance, anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing requirements. On March 15, former central bank governor Abdulkader Husarieh confirmed that the account had become operational, opening the way for renewed correspondent banking relationships, dollar clearing and transfers. On October 5, a central bank delegation led by Governor Safwat Raslan met with Federal Reserve officials to discuss the technical and operational aspects of using the account.
The transaction marks the return of a formal trade-financing instrument after years of reliance on informal arrangements and intermediaries in third countries. While letters of credit are routine instruments in international trade, their use in Syria represents a significant shift. A major US bank has assessed the compliance risks associated with a Syrian counterparty and agreed to participate in the transaction. After decades in which such transactions routinely faced rejection, this willingness to engage marks an important change. If the transaction proceeds without compliance problems, it could establish a precedent for financing other essential imports, including grain, medicines and industrial inputs.
Extending letters of credit to agricultural and industrial inputs, machinery and reconstruction materials could broaden the mechanism’s economic impact. However, such expansion would require Syrian banks and importers to build a consistent compliance record, strengthen documentation procedures, and maintain effective communication with US regulatory authorities. An important test will come when Syrian commercial banks can independently arrange letters of credit for manufacturers in Damascus or medicine importers in Hama without relying on central bank backing for every transaction. Achieving this will require stronger compliance capabilities within commercial banks, credit guarantees that reassure correspondent banks about risks associated with small and medium-sized enterprises, and supervision that international partners can trust.
US Eases Restrictions on Defense Exports to Syria
Effective October 1, 2026, the US Department of State issued a final rule removing Syria from the list of countries subject to a policy of denial under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) will now review, on a case-by-case basis, license applications and other authorization requests involving the export or brokering of defense articles and defense services controlled under the US Munitions List (USML) in connection with Syria.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Syria previously faced a policy of denial for licenses and other authorizations under the ITAR. The final rule implements the rescission of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). Although the rule changes DDTC’s ITAR licensing policy, it does not grant blanket authorization to export, reexport, or retransfer defense articles (including technical data and software), furnish defense services to Syria, the Syrian government, or Syrian persons or nationals, temporarily import defense articles from Syria, or broker US or foreign defense articles or defense services involving Syria. As with other ITAR-controlled exports and brokering activities involving foreign persons, parties must obtain the appropriate DDTC license or other authorization or qualify for an applicable license exemption. The change primarily affects companies operating in the security and aviation sectors, as well as systems integrators working with ITAR-controlled components. Companies undertaking civilian projects should still verify that their bills of materials contain no ITAR-controlled items.
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR), however, have not yet been updated to reflect the rescission of Syria’s SST designation. Exports to Syria of items subject to the EAR continue to require authorization unless the items qualify as EAR99-classified food or medicine or meet the requirements of an applicable license exception. The EAR also continues to classify Syria under Country Group E:1, subjecting it to sanctions, embargoes, and other special controls under Part 746. Nevertheless, the US government has previously indicated that amendments to the EAR provisions concerning Syria are forthcoming.
Syria Removes Individuals and Entities from Domestic Terrorism List
On September 14, 2026, Syria’s Committee for Freezing the Assets of Designated Persons and Entities issued Decision No. 1, removing numerous Syrian and foreign individuals and entities from the country’s domestic terrorism list. The decision, published in the Official Gazette on September 16, 2026, also adopts an updated list of designated individuals and entities and orders the freezing of their assets. The decision replaces the previous list with an amended one, while maintaining asset-freezing measures against those who remain designated.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Syria established its domestic terrorism list in 2017 under its anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing framework, in accordance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. The UN’s 1267 sanctions regime targets individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) and previously included Syria’s current president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the current Minister of Interior, Anas Khattab. The UN removed al-Sharaa and Khattab from its sanctions list in November 2025, followed by HTS in February 2026. Syria’s domestic list extended beyond internationally designated terrorist organizations to include Syrian opposition figures, foreign politicians, religious leaders, businesses, and charitable organizations. The former Assad government periodically updated the list, including in 2024, when it covered hundreds of individuals and entities.
The September 2026 decision marks a significant revision of Syria’s domestic counterterrorism sanctions framework following the fall of the Assad government in December 2024. By removing individuals and entities designated under the previous administration, the Syrian authorities are addressing a legacy of politically contentious listings while retaining the legal framework for targeted asset freezes. The changes could facilitate the restoration of access to assets and financial services for delisted individuals and entities and reduce obstacles to their commercial activities in Syria. For banks, investors, and businesses operating in Syria, the revised list provides an updated basis for domestic sanctions screening and counterparty due diligence. The removal of numerous designations also reduces the risk of inadvertently breaching Syrian asset-freezing restrictions when conducting transactions or transferring funds to previously listed individuals and entities.
Japan Lifts Sanctions on Syrian Banks and State-Owned Entities
On September 29, 2026, the Japanese government approved the lifting of sanctions imposed on 16 Syria-linked entities, including four banks: the Real Estate Bank, the Commercial Bank of Syria, the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, and the Syrian International Islamic Bank. The decision also covers several state-owned enterprises and institutions, including Syriatel, the Syria Trading Oil Company, the General Petroleum Company, and the Mahrukat Company.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Japan was among the last countries to maintain sanctions on these entities, most of which had already been removed from sanctions lists by the EU, US, and UK. Tokyo justified its decision “in view of the subsequent developments in the situation surrounding Syria and considering the bilateral relationship between Japan and Syria.”
The decision comes amid growing interest among East Asian countries in re-engaging with Syria. China and South Korea, in particular, have been exploring opportunities in different sectors. Syria has considered procuring Chinese technology to support its telecommunications towers and the infrastructure of local internet service providers, although the US has warned against such cooperation, citing threats to its national security interests. Meanwhile, South Korea has been engaging closely with Syrian authorities and exploring ways to re-risk the market and encourage Korean banks to process Syria-related transactions, given the commercial opportunities involved.
Japan’s decision is particularly significant given its economic and financial weight. As the world’s fourth-largest provider of official development assistance and home to one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated banking sectors—with major institutions active in international finance and cross-border transactions—Japan could play an important role in Syria’s economic recovery and reconstruction. The lifting of sanctions may create opportunities for greater financial engagement, although the extent to which this translates into development assistance, investment, or renewed banking relationships remains uncertain.
EU Court Upholds Sanctions Against Syrian Businessman Anas Talas
On October 14, 2026, the EU General Court dismissed Syrian businessman Anas Talas’s request to annul the sanctions against him and ordered him to pay the legal costs. The Court cited his involvement in the Marota City real estate project through Talas Group and its joint venture, Mirza, and rejected his arguments that he had no ties to the former Assad regime. Talas maintained that the Assad regime had persecuted him and his businesses, forcing him to flee Syria from 2012 to 2017, arresting his employees, and destroying commercial properties. He also argued that he had remained in Syria following Assad’s fall and continued operating his businesses under the transitional authorities, demonstrating that he no longer had ties to the former regime.
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS: Anas Talas is a prominent Syrian businessman with interests and activities across several sectors of the Syrian economy. In 2018, Talas Group, which he chairs, entered into a SYP 23 billion (approximately USD 52.7 million at the time) joint venture with Damascus Cham Holding to develop Marota City, a luxury residential and commercial project backed by the former Assad regime.
The Court found that Talas had failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of his continued links to the former regime. In particular, he could not substantiate his claims of persecution, demonstrate that he had ended his involvement in Marota City, or establish that he had developed closer ties with the transitional authorities. The Court also rejected his argument that Assad’s fall had rendered the sanctions unnecessary, finding that business networks associated with the former regime could still pose risks to Syria’s political transition.
The judgment confirms that the Court now applies a network-based liability standard rather than an activity-based one. Continued operational capacity inside Syria is no longer required to justify maintaining sanctions. Instead, the Court assesses structural embeddedness in regime-era economic networks, legacy institutional roles, the ability to mobilize capital or influence, and the persistence of patronage ties.
This approach marks a shift from earlier Syria listings, which relied more heavily on evidence that designated individuals continued to provide economic benefit to the regime. In this case, sanctions function primarily as instruments for managing transition-related risks linked to the persistence of regime-era economic networks rather than as accountability measures for past activities. The ruling also makes clear that regime change does not automatically dissolve influence networks. The burden now falls on applicants to demonstrate that their influence has effectively disappeared.
Other prominent businessmen associated with the former Assad regime, including Mohammad Hamcho, Issam Anbouba, Samir al-Dibs, and Issam Shammout, have also pursued legal challenges or sought the removal of themselves or their companies from EU sanctions lists. The Talas judgment illustrates the evidentiary challenges that such individuals may face when seeking delisting under the EU’s revised sanctions framework.