Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is betting that a stable, prosperous post-Assad Syria will bolster his chances in the 2028 elections—and he’s not wrong. But while post-Assad Syria offers openings, major hurdles still stand in his way.
Türkiye aims to dominate the economic landscape in post-Assad Syria
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria entered a new phase of recovery. Türkiye, which supported opposition forces throughout the conflict, quickly emerged as a central actor in reconstruction—across infrastructure, the economy, and governance. Leveraging geographic proximity, pre‑war trade ties, and its deep involvement in the north, Türkiye moved swiftly to integrate its public and private sectors into the rebuilding process.
Turkish construction firms and government agencies spearheaded major rebuilding projects, particularly in housing, public works, and utilities. Cement and steel exports surged, and Turkish contractors began bidding on infrastructure contracts across Syria. A flagship initiative is the large-scale housing program in the northwest, aimed at enabling the voluntary return of up to one million refugees from Türkiye. These projects are backed by Turkish agencies and NGOs such as AFAD and Kızılay, with additional funding from Qatar.
Türkiye has also positioned itself as a crucial energy partner. In May 2025, Syria signed a USD 7 billion energy deal with a Qatar-led consortium—including Turkish companies Kalyon and Cengiz Holding—to build gas and solar power plants. In the meantime, Türkiye agreed to temporarily supply Syria with electricity and natural gas via a dedicated cross-border grid connection.
Trade between the two countries rebounded sharply after Assad’s ouster. Turkish exports rose by approximately 37% in early 2025, particularly in construction materials, food, and machinery, as reported by Reuters. The two governments also agreed to reinstate their pre-war Free Trade Agreement and streamline customs procedures, improving logistical efficiency.
Plans are underway to establish Turkish-run industrial zones inside Syrian territory, offering Turkish firms lower operating costs while creating jobs for Syrians. Turkish ports such as Mersin and İskenderun are being expanded to handle increased cargo flow.
Turkish agribusinesses are investing in agricultural revival by providing seeds, fertilizer, equipment, and contract farming opportunities. In parallel, Turkish and Syrian financial authorities are coordinating to reconnect Syria’s banking system to regional markets, aiming to facilitate trade and capital flow, according to Reuters.
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has resumed operations, focusing on cultural restoration, vocational training, and healthcare infrastructure. Humanitarian organizations like Kızılay and AFAD remain actively involved in building clinics and housing, often in coordination with Gulf and Western donors.
Despite Türkiye’s efforts to take the lead, it faces stiff competition from regional heavyweights. Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—are investing heavily, both to limit Iranian influence and to counter Türkiye’s regional expansion. While Ankara and Riyadh have cooled tensions, their economic rivalry in Syria is intensifying. Meanwhile, Iran and Russia, both long-time backers of the Assad regime, are determined to protect their stakes. Even China is quietly positioning itself for a role in infrastructure and energy projects.
Yet the Syrian state itself poses serious challenges. Years of war have left a devastated economy, shattered infrastructure, and a weak transitional government with limited institutional capacity—creating major risks for Turkish firms seeking stability and legal clarity.
Security risks loom large as well. The resurgence of ISIS in June 2025 threatens the Syrian Interim Government’s (IG) stabilization and reconstruction efforts. With an estimated 2,500 active ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq—and thousands more in prisons and detention camps—the group is exploiting fragile governance, broken infrastructure, and the power vacuum left by Assad’s fall. The IG, already stretched thin and lacking robust administrative or military capacity, must now divert scarce resources to counterterrorism, undermining economic priorities and stalling rebuilding just as it was gaining momentum.
Türkiye’s Push to Return Syrian Refugees Faces Harsh Post-Assad Realities
The return of refugees is also central to both Türkiye and Erdoğan’s Syria policy. Indeed, one of his biggest vulnerabilities remains public resentment toward Syrian refugees—a factor in his party’s 2019 municipal election losses. With Assad gone, Erdoğan is banking on improved conditions to enable large-scale returns and ease political pressure at home. As a result, Türkiye has expanded border processing and promoted “go-and-see” visits to encourage voluntary returns. Over 130,000 refugees have returned since December, but that figure remains a small fraction of the total. Turkish officials insist repatriation will be humane and voluntary, yet nationalists continue to demand quicker, broader action.
Yet the vast majority of refugees are unlikely to return soon.
Despite the regime’s collapse, Syria remains unstable and divided. The IG faces militia clashes, Israeli airstrikes, and collapsing infrastructure. Forced returns remain prohibited under international law, and the UNHCR still considers the country unsafe. Many returnees arrive to find their homes destroyed, services absent, and livelihoods impossible. While a few returned quickly, most remain wary. A January 2025 UN survey found that 80% of respondents expressed hope of returning “someday.” In another survey question, only 27% said they planned to return “in the next 12 months.”
Syria Complicates PKK–Türkiye Talks
A key factor in Erdoğan’s political future is the ongoing dialogue with the Kurds, an issue that also intersects with developments in Syria. Barred from running again in 2028 under the current constitution, Erdoğan is pushing for a new charter to lift term limits and needs pro-Kurdish parliamentary backing to succeed. As a result, his nationalist coalition engaged with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan, resulting in the PKK’s landmark decision to disband and abandon armed struggle.
But the future of the talks now hinges on negotiations between Damascus and the PKK-linked Syrian Kurds.
On 10 March, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—dominated by PKK-affiliated groups—and the transitional government in Damascus signed an agreement outlining the SDF’s phased integration into a unified national military, the disarmament of non-state armed actors, and new administrative arrangements offering local autonomy to Kurdish areas. Stuck between its hostility toward the SDF and its support for Syrian state institutions, Ankara has now repositioned itself as a conditional supporter of the agreement. But its backing depends on three red lines: full disarmament of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), no Kurdish autonomy near the Turkish border, and the exclusion of PKK-linked actors from Syria’s future security structure.
Implementation remains shaky, however. Syrian officials have called Ankara’s demand for YPG disarmament unrealistic, suggesting instead that the group may be absorbed—armed—into the national army. Turkish nationals within YPG ranks add to Erdoğan’s dilemma. Nationalist ally Devlet Bahçeli has already warned that disarmed PKK fighters could simply reemerge across the border.
