Opaque Appointments: Ministerial Advisors and Assistants in Syria
Issue 11
On 2 August 2025, the Secretary-General of the Republic, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s brother, Maher, issued a directive canceling all advisor appointments within central administrations and affiliated entities, rendering dozens of contracts null and void.
Citing the need to streamline performance and align with State Council Law 32 of 2019, the decision halts the proliferation of ad hoc advisory roles that had emerged during the post-Assad transition. While framed as a step toward institutional order, it also highlights the opaque and improvised nature of the appointment process in recent months.
Even if many roles have been retroactively voided, looking at how they were selected remains key to understanding some of the dynamics underpinning transitional institutions.
Opaque Appointment Methods
Since December 2024, our data shows that appointment processes were extremely opaque, with no standardized or transparent mechanism governing who is appointed, how, or under what legal framework.
While 31 assistants and 3 advisors were officially appointed by presidential decree, others (8 assistants, 8 advisors, and 5 executive advisors) appear to have been installed directly through ministerial decisions. Notably, 14 appointments occurred entirely through undocumented channels, with no public record of the procedures involved. In practice, these individuals simply appeared in the media or alongside their ministers, introduced as advisors or assistants despite the absence of any formal announcement or legal appointment.
Moreover, there is no centralized database or official registry of appointments. Instead, announcements are sporadically made on social media, or occasionally on ministry-affiliated platforms, bypassing the Official Gazette most of the time. Only 18 appointments (all of whom being assistants appointed via presidential decree) were published in the Gazette. No advisor appointments were published there, and some presidential decrees were also omitted, further complicating the process. This lack of consistency raises concerns about accountability, legal standing, and the criteria by which individuals are elevated to senior government roles.
According to Law 32 of 2019 governing the State Council, ministries and public bodies can request advisors, assistant advisors, or first-grade deputies, but the process is tightly regulated. The State Council is Syria’s highest administrative court and chief legal advisor. It oversees the legality of administrative acts and drafts laws, decrees, and contracts.
Under Article 68, such appointments are not unilateral ministerial prerogatives. They require a formal request from the ministry, approval by the State Council’s Special Council, and a decision by the President of the State Council. The law also stipulates that these roles are secondments, not permanent positions within the ministry’s staffing structure, and that seconded officials remain administratively attached to the State Council. Since 4 June, the Council has been headed by AbdulRazzaq Mustafa Al-Kaadi.
In the meantime, however, most recent ministerial decisions related to appointments do not seem based on relevant grounds. For instance, Ministry of Economy and Industry Decision 416 cites only “based on work requirements” (بناء على مقتضيات العمل). Decision 391 is based on Presidential Decision 9 (on the formation of the cabinet), which does not cover procedures for the appointment of advisors or assistants. Other appointments have simply been “announced” on social media.
Presidential decrees do not offer a stronger legal basis. They cite only the “provisions of the constitutional declaration,” which itself does not provide for such appointments.
As a result, the Secretary-General’s directive—citing Article 68 as its legal basis—appears aimed at reasserting this formal process and nullifying appointments made outside it. By framing the cancellations within the State Council’s statutory authority, the move appears to be a corrective to recent ad hoc practices. However, the government has yet to provide a public explanation of its rationale or outline how future appointments will be handled. Paradoxically, questions also linger over the precise legal mandate of the Secretary-General and the scope of authority exercised by his Secretariat.
Some observers, however, have linked the timing of the Secretary-General’s directive to the resignation of Sima Abdel Rabbo. She was appointed without an official announcement as Senior Advisor to the Minister of Economy and Industry for Governance and Public Relations on 31 May 2025, then resigned after a public post condemning the government’s handling of the Sweida crisis and calling for international intervention. The backlash to her comments and her resignation may have prompted the government to tighten control over advisory appointments, using the new directive both to vet candidates more rigorously and to limit the risk of public dissent from within senior ranks.
Finally, the extent to which the directive has been implemented and which appointments it targets remains unclear. Public communications and media appearances after 2 August still refer to certain individuals by their advisory titles—and they have likewise introduced themselves to us in the same capacity—suggesting that, in practice, the directive’s application may be uneven or delayed.
