Manufacturing the Threat: Israel’s Syria Policy After Assad

By: Charles Lister 

Under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria was the jewel in the crown of Iran’s regional agenda. Beyond Syria’s diplomatic, economic and security ties to Iran and its militia proxies across the region, Syria’s international airports in Damascus and Aleppo were central cogs in Iran’s transnational weapons trafficking enterprise, principally to arm Lebanese Hezbollah. With the onset of conflict in Syria, a land bridge for transiting weapons and Iranian proxy fighters emerged and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) took charge of several Syrian military research and development facilities, including some dedicated to rocket and missile development.

For Israel, the fall of Assad’s regime represented a game-changing development, but the emergence of a new government dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other armed factions was instantly perceived as a potential threat. At the root of the crisis that has followed is the impact of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, which were a paradigm shift for Israel’s national security psyche. Assad was the devil Israel knew, but HTS was not. Rather than relying on its traditional approach of deterrence, Israel sought to pre-emptively neutralize potential future threats. In Syria, this carries a great risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

While Israel’s risk calculus has changed in recent years, domestic politics are far from united behind the Netanyahu government’s approach to Syria. With a general election set for October 27, 2026, Syria policy has emerged as a point of contention. Leader of the Democrats, Yair Golan – a former Commander of the IDF’s Northern Command – called recent airstrikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Idlib “arrogant and dangerous,” claiming that “once again, military force is being used for political considerations.” Former Prime Minister and IDF Chief of the General Staff Ehud Barak called the strikes “reckless and foolish” and “a deliberate escalation,” accusing Netanyahu of engaging in the “survival maneuvers of a compulsive gambler.” 

With polls currently showing Netanyahu’s bloc trailing the opposition, opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot has stated his desire to prioritize “a much-improved interim agreement in Syria.” 

Beyond Netanyahu’s political motives, there is a deeper consensus within Israel’s security establishment to invest more in talks with Syria. Netanyahu’s former National Security Advisor also made this case in January 2026, calling for a “Syria first” policy to build on the “impressive” shared interests between Jerusalem and Damascus. This presents an opening for the US government, which is best placed to convince a new Israeli government to change tack and prioritize diplomacy and a policy of “test and verify.”

While renewed US-mediated talks may continue in the coming weeks, it is hard to envision a deal coming to fruition before Israel’s elections conclude. For now, efforts must focus on avoiding any further escalation. But the ingredients for a security deal do exist, and the US is determined to see one achieved.