Interview: Mazen Darwish, President of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression
Axis One: Transitional Justice
Q: You have repeatedly announced the filing of legal cases against individuals accused of war crimes, and you have stated that some have obtained new identities. What mechanisms are you currently using to track these individuals after the regime’s fall? And do you see international litigation as a viable path, or must the primary track be Syrian?
There is a fundamental problem: Syria still lacks a national transitional justice plan. This should have begun the day the national dialogue failed to produce a national commission tasked with developing one.
At present, we are moving through ad-hoc steps without a governmental or independent strategy, whether within the Transitional Justice Commission or in coordination with Syrian civil society. Measures such as the coastal trials, recent arrests, and publicized investigations are mostly reactive. They include producing detained figures—such as Atef Najib—before investigative judges and the coastal trials, which must ultimately be integrated into a broader transitional justice process, as the events on the coast are inseparable from the wider conflict.
Regarding high-ranking fugitives, we are cooperating with multiple actors. We have secured more than 20 international arrest warrants from French courts. Together with investigative judges, the public prosecutor, French war crimes police, and the Center, we formed what is now called the Marcos Task Force—a joint unit for tracking individuals subject to arrest warrants. On this basis, requests were sent to Lebanon and to certain Gulf countries where additional individuals are being pursued.
These paths must complement each other. Accountability must, in principle, be Syrian. But because many perpetrators fled abroad and due to the complexity of these cases, roles must be integrated: Syrian national trials, universal-jurisdiction prosecutions in countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and—where relevant—engagement with the International Criminal Court.
Q: You believe there is no strategic vision for transitional justice. How do you assess the performance of the Transitional Justice Commission so far?
From the beginning, the structure lacked strategic vision. I do not place the blame on Commission members; they simply do not have the space to operate freely.
We are awaiting a draft Transitional Justice Law, addressing the legislative gaps created by the Constitutional Declaration, which left the country in a prolonged vacuum.
We also await the formation of the People’s Assembly and the presidential appointment of the final third of its members. Hundreds of laws require amendment or replacement. Even the Syrian criminal framework does not cover war crimes or crimes against humanity. The problem began with the dialogue process, continued through the Constitutional Declaration, and now burdens the Commission, which is racing to produce a draft law while facing significant public pressure.
Comparative experiences show that post-conflict environments often need two years to build legal structures, courts, and training programs. But the adrenaline following the regime’s fall led to unrealistic promises: salary increases of 400%, 24-hour electricity, prosecuting all perpetrators, compensating all victims. These unrealistic expectations were not helpful.
Related to the topic of transitional justice, we have begun recovering funds from Rifaat al-Assad. The French government is preparing to transfer EUR 32 million of his confiscated assets to the Syrian government. We have worked on this file for many years and are pleased to finally see positive results.
The remainder of his assets will be transferred gradually. We are also working to expand the scope of confiscations beyond the EUR 80 million already seized, including additional properties in France. Protocols between the two governments have been established. The Syrian government is expected to designate spending areas, after which France will transfer the funds.
Q: Could France impose conditions on how the funds are used?
To our knowledge, no conditions exist. We hope the funds will be used for justice pathways, the search for the missing, and victim reparations.
Q: On a personal level, how do you feel about this achievement, given your years of work to support victims and hold perpetrators accountable?
I am, above all, a Syrian citizen—and one of the victims. My immediate family, including my parents, in-laws, and myself, were subjected to arrest, disappearance, and other violations. This work matters deeply to us personally.
In the coming days, together with Syrian partners, we will file a case in Denmark against a Danish company involved in supplying fuel to Russian aircraft between 2015 and 2017. We will seek compensation for victims and for the Syrian government.
Q: Where do things stand regarding Rifaat al-Assad’s assets in the UK, Spain, and other countries?
We will intensify our legal action in Spain. One of the lessons of recent years is that no path is closed before determined victims. In 2023, when a local court issued an arrest warrant against Bashar al-Assad while he was still president, it was historically unprecedented. Many considered it impossible, but persistence and courage have shown that nothing is impossible.
Axis Two: The Coastal Violations and Judicial Proceedings
Q: Your July report on coastal violations stated that “acknowledgment is not weakness but the highest form of moral courage.” After the formation of the official committee, how satisfied are you with the justice pathway so far? And what is your assessment of the televised trials?
What is not acknowledged is not punished; and what is not punished is repeated.
The very formation of a committee is new in Syria. Acknowledging that around 1,500 civilians were unlawfully killed is positive. There are, however, differences between our report and the committee’s findings—its reluctance to identify government-linked entities, which we documented, and its differing legal classifications of the killings (intentional versus non-intentional).
Nonetheless, interviewing victims, formally recording the killings, and naming suspects—even when they are linked to former regime networks or government bodies—is a positive step. We had hoped the full report would be published, as transparency demands, but this did not occur.
As for the trials, justice cannot be separated from social and political realities. Law reflects these realities, and its application must align with them. Integrating coastal crimes into a transitional justice framework would have been preferable.
There are multiple layers of victimhood: the civilian victims, but also the 285 security and Defense Ministry personnel killed in various ambushes. Their families also need acknowledgment and accountability. Justice must balance the rights of all victims.
Ensuring victims’ access to the courts is essential. Some families asked how to attend hearings, participate, or appoint lawyers. These procedural rights are crucial across all sides.
Q: What is your procedural assessment of these trials? Some argue that legal representation was not guaranteed for all parties, and that aspects of the process did not align with Syrian law.
Some procedural elements remain unclear. It is not understood why military investigative judges conducted the investigations while the trials are held before ordinary criminal courts.
It is also unclear whether suspects had legal representation during the investigation phase; indications suggest they did not. In the first hearing, the judge appointed public defenders because some suspects had no lawyers, an indication that they likely lacked representation earlier.
Transparency is also limited. Trials were announced only a day or two in advance. The investigative process—who conducted it and under what authority—was similarly opaque.
Legal and procedural soundness must be paired with clear public communication.
Axis Three: Corruption, Asset Recovery, and the Sovereign Fund
Q: Regarding the looting of Syrian assets abroad: is the Center moving toward litigation inside Syria on corruption and human rights violations?
Inside Syria, we are supporting the Transitional Justice Commission, the Missing Persons Commission, and the Ministry of Justice. With the regime’s fall, institutional roles must be redefined. Previously, no governmental body carried these responsibilities, so civil society often acted as the public prosecutor and the justice ministry. We do not want this to continue.
Our role now is to step back and support official institutions. We are also committed to ensuring that reconstruction does not come at the expense of victims’ rights.
The former regime’s corruption was structural, not episodic. We must ensure that corruption and patronage do not define the new Syrian economy. Recovering Syrian assets is a top priority.
We hear of settlements and asset recovery by the Sovereign Fund and other agencies, but the process lacks transparency.
Q: Should these settlements be public? And procedurally, what should have been done? What is good or bad about the Sovereign Fund’s current mechanism?
The positive element is speed: this mechanism quickly generates revenue for the state treasury—important given Syria’s circumstances. The core problem is the absence of transparency. We cannot assess the mechanism without access to its results and details.
Axis Four: Accountability for All Parties and Future Prospects
Q: Do you expect that transitional justice in Syria will eventually include accountability for violations committed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or other current armed actors? Or is this unrealistic?
It is not unrealistic. Over the past six months, through victims’ advocacy and civil-society action, we have seen responsiveness from the Presidency acknowledging that the Commission’s work must include all violations and all victims. The Commission’s leadership has affirmed this.
The process will not be easy, but we must avoid raising victims’ expectations unrealistically. Criminal accountability for every perpetrator in any conflict is impossible; this is true across all international experiences. But strategic, balanced litigation that protects victims’ rights is essential.
Q: Any final remarks?
I have many objections and notes on current processes, but with the regime’s fall, we have an opportunity we must seize.
Somehow we all ended up in one boat—Syrians from all sides. Either we survive together or sink together. Justice, the missing, and accountability are not luxuries; they are part of Syria’s future. Failure is not an option.