Syria’s Post-War Economic Architecture: Centralization, Funds, and Reform

Beyond creating the Supreme Council and revamping the SIA, Decree 114 of 2025 also anchors the new economic order by amending Investment Law 18 of 2021. The law now covers not only new projects but also the rehabilitation of Syria’s idle industrial base, while introducing stronger protections for property rights through judicial oversight and market-value compensation.

Designed to attract foreign capital, the reforms lift restrictions on salary repatriation for expatriates, allow international arbitration in disputes with the state, and streamline licensing through faster approvals and empowered one-stop centers. These measures directly target investor concerns about asset security and bureaucratic delays. 

Two New Funds

As part of the restructuring of economic institutions, two new financial vehicles were launched in 2025: the Syrian Development Fund (Decree 112 of 2025) and the Syrian Sovereign Fund (Decree 113 of 2025). Both were placed under direct presidential authority, further centralizing control over economic policymaking. 

The Syrian Development Fund, inaugurated in Damascus in September 2025, is framed as a reconstruction tool with a populist character. According to Articles 2, 7, and 8 of Decree 112 of 2025, the Fund is administratively linked to the Presidency, with both its Board of Directors and Director-General appointed by presidential decree. This structure places the Fund under direct presidential oversight, with no mention of ministerial or parliamentary supervision.

Its capital base derives from voluntary contributions by Syrians at home and abroad, along with other donations and grants. The fund’s mandate is to “contribute to reconstruction; to restore and develop infrastructure that supports citizens’ daily life, including services and facilities such as roads, bridges, water and electricity networks, airports, seaports, telecommunications, and others.” Its Director-General, Mohammad Safwat AbdulHamid Raslan, was appointed by Decree 117 of 2025 (see this week’s interview with Safwat Raslan).

By contrast, the Syrian Sovereign Fund serves as the state’s investment arm. Funded through state allocations, asset returns, and revenues from its own activities, it is tasked “to implement developmental and productive projects; to ensure the optimal investment of human, material, and technical resources; to stimulate the national economy through well-designed and diversified investments; and to convert idle government assets into tools of production and development.” Sources have alleged that assets seized from former Assad-era cronies, along with their proceeds, will directly finance the fund; however, this has not been confirmed by the government.

With a board of experts appointed by the Presidency and oversight mechanisms such as quarterly reports and external audits, as outlined in Articles 2, 4, 7, and 8 of Decree 113 of 2025, the Fund is designed to project credibility. Yet in practice, its direct subordination to the presidency, exemption from ministerial or legislative oversight, and lack of mandated public financial reporting leave major transparency and accountability gaps—particularly given that these assets were built with public funds. As of the end of September 2025, the Fund’s Director-General had not yet been appointed.

Looking Ahead

Syria’s post-war economic architecture creates a vertically integrated model: strategy concentrated in the Supreme Council, execution through a streamlined Investment Agency, and financing via a sovereign and a development fund. While this structure promises agility and improved coordination, it also carries significant risks.

First, it fosters cronyism. With decision-making concentrated in the presidency and boards composed entirely of presidential appointees, little prevents projects and investments from being directed to insiders, with the lack of tenders—or at least opaque procedures—reinforcing this perception. For instance, among the MoUs awarded to local and international companies in recent months, several have raised concerns about fair competition: the apparent proximity between HTS and the Al-Khayyats drew scrutiny, as did the fact that two projects totaling USD 2.5 billion were awarded to a Syrian-owned, Italy-based company with only one employee.

Moreover, the absence of public oversight risks marginalizing local and private actors. Removing business federations, professional unions, and ministerial voices from key decision-making bodies may accelerate approvals but comes at the expense of transparency and accountability. This dynamic has already fueled tensions with the business community, illustrated by the collective resignation of nine members of the Aleppo Chamber of Industry’s Executive Office over what they described as “deliberate marginalization” and government inaction on their demands. At the same time, Syrian businessmen have voiced criticism of the authorities for sidelining domestic investors in favor of politically driven deals with foreign firms.

Ultimately, these risks strike at the core of whether Syria’s reconstruction model can attract critical capital or relapse into patterns of rent-seeking. For investors, the credibility of arbitration clauses and property guarantees depends less on the text of the law than on the governance environment in which they operate. For citizens, the promise of reconstruction is tied not only to the pace of rebuilding but to whether the benefits are broadly shared. The success of Syria’s post-war reforms will therefore hinge not merely on legal amendments and new institutions but on whether governance can inspire trust among investors, donors, and the population at large.