EU–Syria Dialogue: Normalization Enters Delivery Phase

By: Ben Fève

The first high-level EU–Syria political dialogue marks a further step toward normalizing relations between Brussels and Damascus. The political dialogue, the restoration of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement, and coordination meetings on funding priorities are creating a more structured framework for cooperation, even in the absence of a broader Syria strategy.

On May 11, 2026, the EU and Syria held their first high-level political dialogue in Brussels following the collapse of the Assad regime, co-chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. On the same day, the European Council restored the EU–Syria Cooperation Agreement, which had been partially suspended in 2011. 

This is the clearest institutional step yet in the normalization of EU–Syria relations and marks, in many respects, a return to the pre-2011 relationship. The dialogue moves engagement beyond ad hoc visits and humanitarian support toward a more formal channel for political, economic, and technical cooperation. Restoring the Cooperation Agreement paves the way for the resumption of EU–Syria Cooperation Council meetings and discussions surrounding the Association Agreement.

For Syria, this supports the government’s narrative of economic recovery, market reopening, and reintegration with Europe, while potentially boosting broader confidence in the country. For the EU, it creates an opportunity to become a more influential actor in Syria’s physical and political reconstruction by shaping the transition through institutional support, economic recovery instruments, and conditional re-engagement. The challenge, however, is that this new political momentum is emerging faster than the operational framework needed to sustain it.

Despite this progress, the relationship still faces important structural and operational constraints:

• EU engagement with Syria now has a clearer political channel but still lacks a coherent framework that links dialogue, funding, reforms, and implementation, comparable to country action plans and multiannual indicative programs.
• EU support remains constrained by fragmented instruments and a limited in-country presence, while Syrian institutions continue to face centralized decision-making and weak administrative capacity.
• Restoring the Cooperation Agreement carries great political value, but many suspended provisions had already become redundant after the lifting of sectoral sanctions. 
• The Cooperation Agreement may facilitate Syrian exports, but it does not automatically make them competitive or attractive in European markets.
• European officials increasingly frame engagement as gradual and conditional, suggesting that deeper involvement will depend on greater transparency, clearer implementation mechanisms, and institutional progress from the Syrian side.

Looking ahead, both sides will increasingly face the challenge of translating political normalization into practical cooperation and measurable delivery:

• Stakeholders should expect more structured EU–Syria engagement around recovery, institutional capacity, trade, and regional stabilization.
• The key test is whether Damascus treats the EU as a strategic partner rather than a secondary donor, while the EU clarifies how political dialogue translates into sequenced funding, technical cooperation, and visible socio-economic delivery.