US Congress Sets Conditions for Future Security Cooperation with Syria  

By: Charles Lister  

On 16 June, the US Senate released its text for the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). While the April 2026 departure of US military forces from Syria shifted attention away from the Syria file, the NDAA drafting process retained several policy areas relevant to Syria, its ongoing transition, and the future of US–Syria security relations.

For now, the NDAA contains text aimed at “reducing Russian influence in Syria or securing the departure of Russian forces,” as well as drafting a strategy to counter what remains of the Assad regime-linked captagon trade and a report on barriers to US investment in Syria. But most significantly, the 2027 NDAA will—in theory—reauthorize the Defense Department’s Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), requesting USD 130 million to support “vetted Syrian groups and individuals” (VSGI) with “equipment, supplies and services” as well as “small arms and light weapons” to support ongoing and future operations against ISIS inside Syria and the continued detention of ISIS prisoners. The original CTEF request, issued in April 2026, defined VSGI as “including former Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Free Army (SFA) members who have, or are integrating into the new Syrian security apparatus, and other future vetted groups.” 

However, the Senate’s NDAA text places significant conditions on any defense cooperation with Syria, with no funds to be spent until the Secretary of Defense confirms that:

• “all foreign fighters and jihadists” are removed from the armed forces and “other government services” and “disarmed”
• a “system to monitor foreign fighters and jihadists” is established to “prevent attacks on the United States and allies and partners…including the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces”
• “Al-Qaeda and associated or successor groups” are countered
• “members and leaders of al-Qaeda” are prevented from entering or remaining in Syria
• the SDF is “fairly integrated” into Syria’s armed forces
• “attacks and violence” against Kurds and Druze are prevented.

These conditions reflect significant concerns within parts of Congress that have intensified since the violence in As-Suwayda in July 2025 and the conflict with the SDF in January 2026. Damascus and its representatives in Washington will need to work much harder on Congressional engagement to resolve these challenges and improve understanding and trust.

Assuming these conditions remain—particularly those pertaining to foreign fighters—it is hard to envision any US defense funding being provided to Syria. The mid-2025 integration of approximately 2,500 foreign fighters into the Defense Ministry’s 84th Division, with the explicit assent of the US government, was a solution to an otherwise impossible situation. Expelling them would trigger major conflict and potentially pose an existential threat to a fragile transition. Absent US defense support, the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence will continue to lead Syria’s counterterrorism activities. With ISIS weak but not defeated, Syria will need to acquire external support from a broad range of partners. This could include support from the US through non-public funding.